5

POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT
AND UNEMPLOYMENT

"Work is the refuge of people who have nothing better to do."
Oscar Wilde

This chapter contains a series of population and employment briefs. Among other things, they highlight the following points.

Trends. The first things to check when assessing longer-term economic trends are employment, productivity and investment. The brief on Productivity (page 49) shows their relationship to growth.

The size and age structure of the population provides an indicator of long-term pressures on the economy. GDP must grow at least as fast as the population if output per head is not to decline, while an increasing number of people of working age may signal enhanced productive potential, or higher unemployment.

Cycles. Unemployment is an excellent indicator of the state of the economic cycle. High unemployment (compared with the average over the past few years) suggests a recessionary gap. Low unemployment at the top of the cycle is broadly indicative of inflationary pressures. Note, however, that unemployment lags the cycle by perhaps six months (see Cyclical indicators, page 51).

Services. The services sector accounts for 60-70% of output in the major industrialised countries, but it is relatively neglected among the commonly followed indicators of output. Employment provides a useful guide to activity in the sector.

Incomes. Employment data provide guides to personal incomes wages and unit labour costs (see pages 81, 200 and 204). Them are the basis for measuring GDP on an incomes basis and fey help when assessing inflationary pressures.

56

POPULATION

POPULATION

Measures: Significance: Presented as: Focus on: Yardstick:

Total number of people in a country. Yardstick for minimum GDP growth.

Total number.
Age structure and changes.

The OECD population grew by 0.9% a year during the first half of the 1990s. Average annual growth of 0.5% was forecast for the period 1991-2000.

Released: 		Annually.

Overview

Real GDP must grow as least as fast as the population if living standards are not to fall. This may not be too hard in the industrial countries, where populations are expected to grow by less than 0.5% a year in 1990-2000. It will be more difficult in sub-Saharan Africa, where populations will increase by around 3% a year over the same period. Developing countries elsewhere are likely to expand a little less rapidly, except for some Arab states and China. The population of China is projected to grow by 1.3% a year in 1990-2000.

Migration and the age structure have important effects on output (see Labour or workforce, page 58).

Table 5.1 Population

	Total				Total	Growth
	1970				1997	1991-2000	Area
	m				m	%	'000 kxnz

Australia					12.5	18.5	1.3	7,687
Belgium					9.7	10.2	0.2	31
Canada					21.3	30.3	0.8	9,976
France					50.8	58.6	0.4	552
Germany					77.7	82.1	0.0	357
Japan					53.7	57.5	0.1	301
	103.3				126.2	0.3	378
Netherlands					13.0	15.6	0.8	37
Spain					33.8	39.3	0.1	505
Sweden
	8.0				8.8
			0.6		45
Switzerland					6.2
		7.1			0.7
				41
LTIK					55.4	59.0	0.2	245
TJSA
DECD					205.0	266.8	0.9	9,373
	714.1				780.0	0.5	133,609
X_

urces: DECD; World Bank.

57





S POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

bn

World population

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1700 1400 1600 78001000 2700

Source: United Nations.		'Forecast.

20 biggest populations, m

20 fc~

050 forecast

		India
		China
	Pakistan
United States
	Nigeria
	Indonesia
		Brazil
Bangladesh
	Ethiopia
		Iran
		Zaire
	Mexico
	Philippines
	Vietnam
		Egypt
		Russia
		Japan
		Turkey
South Africa

Tanzania

Source: United Nations.

MORE PEOPLE AND CROWDED PLACES

Enjoy a bit of solitude while you still can. According to the United Nations, the world's population is going to double to 11 billion - during the next two centuries. Such long-term forecasts can, however, be subject to wild errors.

The UN reckons that at some time in the middle of the next century India will overtake China as the world's most populous country, with more than 1.5 billion people. This assumes annual population growth of around 0.9% for India, compared with only 0.4% a year for China, which restricts couples to one child each. Trailing those two countries by a billion people or so, Pakistan is expected to displace the United States as the third most populous country, with around 357m inhabitants.

The Economist, February 1st 1997

LABOUR OR WORKFORCE

Measures: Employees plus self-employed plus the unemployed. Significance: Indicator of maximum potential output Presented as: Total number.

Focus on:		Structure and changes.
Yardstick:		Average annual growth in the OECD labour force was 1ounder I % in I 994-95.
Released:		Monthly, at least one month in arrears; see Employm~; 71.1
	page 61.

58

LABOUR OR WORKFORCE

Definitions

The labour force or workforce is the number of people employed and self-employed plus those unemployed but ready and able to work. The grand total is sometimes known as the economically active population. The components of the labour force are notoriously difficult to measure (see also Employment and Unemployment, pages 61 and 63).

The labour force is defined variously to include, for example, people whose age in years is over 14 (Italy), 15 (Canada), 16 (America), or in the range 16-64 (Sweden) or 16-74 (Norway).

There is a tendency to focus on the civilian labour force (that is, excluding the armed forces). Spain includes professional military personnel but excludes conscripts from its regular figures.

Changes in the labour force

The things to watch for are the three factors which affect the size of the labour force: population, migration and the proportion participating in economic activity.

Population. Birth rates in most industrial countries fell to replacement levels or lower in the 1980s. Meanwhile, earlier population growth boosted to record levels the number of 15-24 year-olds entering the labour force (exceptions include Japan and Switzerland). This implies an older workforce and higher old-age dependency rates (the number of retired people as a percentage of the population of working age) in the future. Output per employee must grow for GDP per head to stand still. By 2010 15-20% of the population in industrial economies will be over 65 years of age.

Developing countries have young populations with up to 50% under 15 years. This suggests an expanding working-age population with potential problems for housing and job creation.

Migration. In the industrial countries inflows of foreign workers increased in the late 1980s and a substantial number of illegal unmigrants were granted amnesty in America, France, Italy and Spain. Foreign-born persons account for over 5% of the labour force in America, Germany and France; around 20% in Switzerland and Canada; and over 25% in Australia.

Inward migration may be a bonus for some economies. For ~ ample, the unification of east and west Germany boosted that

n~ s productive potential. However, large numbers of refogees seeking asylum can have significant adverse effects on come per head.

59










5

POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

	Wealthier developing countries, especially oil producers, have large proportions of foreigners in their labour forces. Workers frequently make a substantial contribution to the balance f payments in their home countries by remitting savings from their salaries.

Table 5.2 Labour force
(including armed forces)

Size m
1997 1973
	79

Annual % change

1979- 1989- 1995 1996 1997
89		94

	Female particip. rate

1987

Australia				9.2	1.5	2.5	1.9		2.8	1.3	0.9	57.6	64.7
Austria				3.9	...	0.3	1.5		-0.3	-0.2	0.3	53.0	61.9
Belgium				4.3	0.9	0.3	0.9		0.5	0.1	0.2	50.6	56.5
Canada				15.4	3.2	2.3	1.3		0.7	1.5	1.3	65.5	67.8
Denmark				3.9	...	0.9	-0.3		-0.7	-0.4	1.0	76.8	75.1
France				25.7	0.9	0.7	0.7		0.1	0.9	0.5	72.9	71.3
Germany				39.6	2.5	0.9	0.7		-0.5	-0.2	-0.1	54.5	61.8
Italy				23.4	1.1	0.7	-0.3		0.2	0.5	0.2	43.4	44.1
Japan				67.9	0.8	1.4	1.5		0.3	0.7	1.1	57.6	63.6
Netherlands 7.7					1.1		0.9	1.9	1.9	1.5	2.2	48.8 62.2
Spain				16.3	0.1		2.2	1.1	0.5	0.9	1.1	37.747.1
Sweden				4.3	1.2	0.7	-0.8	1.3 -0.2	-1.1	79.474.5
	Switzerland 4.0				-0.9		1.9	1.7	-0.2	0.7	0.2	57.3	69.4
UK				28.7	0.6		0.9	-0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	62.4	66.8
USA				137.3	2.6		1.9	1.5	1.0	1.2	1.7	66.2	71.3
EU15				170.4	0.6		0.7	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4	52.5	58.3
OECD				516.1	1.3		1.6	1.1	0.8	0.9	1.2	n.a.	59.6

Source: DECD.

Figure 5.1

Growth in the labour force

Annual % change, 1990-95

3

i



.iSP acJe av?

~~ a.~a ye~d' Ns					.h hJ.	1.0 yrx 0ov9	~'s~	H~ v~-	rec~ P~

Ot

1.0

		0.5				0.6	0.6	0.6
0.2 						0.2
	-0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0. ,1 r--1 r7in F1 [1_ F1

0.9			0.9	1.0

60

EMPLOYMENT

Participation. Participation rates (the labour force as a percentage of the total population) generally increased in the 1980s and early 1990s with earlier retirement for men, especially in France, Finland and Holland, generally offset by more married women entering the labour force, especially in America, Australia, Britain, New Zealand and Scandinavia.
	Women account for a smaller proportion of the workforce in Muslim countries (20%) and a greater proportion in Africa (up to 50%) where they traditionally work on the land.

EMPLOYMENT

Significance: Presented as: Focus on: Yardstick:

Measures:		Total employment = employees in employment plus the
	self-employed.
	Indicator of current output potential.
	Totals.
	Structure and changes.
	OECD employment grew by 1.2% a year during the 1980s
	and by 0.4% during the period 1990-95.
Released:		Monthly, at least one month in arrears.

Data collection

Measuring employment is tricky. The main sources of data are censuses and surveys of population and employment. Household
surveys are generally the most reliable since surveys of employers tend to double count people with more than one job.
Most countries conduct household surveys; some monthly (Aus-

tralia, Britain, Japan, North America), some quarterly (Italy, New Zealand), some annually (Belgium, Greece) and some less frequently still (Turkey). Figures for months between main surveys are based on employment surveys or are estimates or interpolation.
	Apart from the definitional problems mentioned in the previus brief, other distortions and international inconsistencies arise wmg to factors such as the method of counting home workers and domestic servants, part-time staff, people with more than

ne 1b, and those temporarily ill or laid off. Full employment is usually defined as the workforce less the natural rate of unemployment. (See also Unemployment, page 63.)

Basic analysis

The level of production depends on the number of people

~a plyed hours worked, education, training and the quality of
pital equipment. (See also Productivity, page 49.)
S POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

	Hours worked consists of core hours and overtime. There is a tendency for core hours to decline as economies mature and workers demand more leisure.

Interpretation

Employment and unemployment are highly cyclical. When demand increases, companies first tend to increase overtime. They take on more employees only when higher demand is perceived to be strong and durable. When demand turns down, hours are cut before jobs.
	Watch hours worked and overtime for early signals, and employment for confirmation. Survey evidence (see Business conditions, page 103) indicating plans to take on or lay off workers may also provide early warning of changes in employment.
	Try to identify to what extent an increase in payrolls represents second jobs. These limit employers' ability to increase output. A high number of second jobs with low unemployment suggest that any increase in consumer demand may be inflationary.

Sectoral trends. Where employment figures are available by sector, they provide a rough and ready guide to output trends in various parts of the economy. Employment in services is an imperfect but useful indicator for that sector since output data for service industries are hard to find.

Table 5.3 Total employment

Total
m		Annual % change

1997 1961- 1970- 1980- 1990-
69				79	89	94

1995			1996	1999

Australia					8.4	2.7	1.6	2.4	0.4	4.1	1.3	0~8
Austria				3.7	-0.6	0.2	0.5	1.4	-0.4	-0.7	0.3
Belgium					3.7	0.7	0.2	0.0	-0.1	0.5	0.4	0.3
Canada				13.9	3.6	2.9	2.0	0.3	1.6	1.2	1.9
Denmark					2.6	1.0	0.6	0.5	-0.8	1.4	1.3	2~1
France				22.0	0.9	0.6	0.2	-0.1	0.8	0.1	0.4
Germany					35.4	0.2	0.1	0.4	4.8	-0.4	-1.3	-1.3
Italy				20.0	-0.4	0.5	0.4	-0.7	-0.6	0.4	0.0
Japan				65.6	1.5	0.8	1.1	1.0	0.1	0.4	1.1
Netherlands 7.2					1.3		0.3	0.7	1.6	2.4	2.0	3.4
Spain				12.8	0.8		-0.1	0.1	-0.9	1.8	1.5	2.9
Sweden				3.9		0.7	1.0	0.7	-2.5	1.6	-0.6	-1.1
	Switzerland 3.8				1.6		0.0	1.8	0.4	0.3	0.3	-0.3
UK				26.6	0.2		0.3	0.6	-1.1	1.2	1.1	1.6
USA				129.6	2.0		2.4	1.7	1.0	1.5	1.4	2~2
EU15				150.1	...		...	...	...	0.6	0.3	0.6
DECD				476.6	0.9		1.0	1.0	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.5

Source: DECD.

62

UNEMPLOYMENT AND VACANCIES

Figure 5.2

Growth in employment

%change, 1987-97
	19.1

2.6
0.9		-2_5 -3.6
~w ~aW exec

Source:OECD.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND VACANCIES

Significance: Presented as: Focus on: Yardstick:

Measures:		Total = people out of work but ready and able to work
	Rate = unemployment as a percentage of the labour force.
	Indicator of spare labour capacity (and wasted resources).
	Total number, percentage.
	Structure and changes.
	The OECD standardised rate of unemployment averaged
	7.5% between 1991 and 1998.
Released:		Monthly, at least one month in arrears.

Total unemployment. Based on people registered as unemployed (Austria, Switzerland) or claiming benefit (Belgium, Britain) or on survey evidence (Britain again, and many other countries). Surveys tend to make better indicators because they

catch people who would take employment if work was available but who are not registered as unemployed.
	Distortions and international inconsistencies arise owing to factors such as students claiming benefits during vacations, the treat-

ment of people temporarily laid off, discouraged workers who do not declare themselves available for work, and people who have Part-time jobs but who are looking for full-time employment.

The unemployment rate. Usually defined as unemployment as
a Percentage of the labour force (the employed plus the unemployed). National variations are rife: Germany excludes the self-

emploYed from the labour force; Belgium produces two unemployment rates expressing unemployment as a percentage

63
S POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

of both the total and the insured labour force; Switzerland bases its labour force on the 1980 census of population.
	By changing the definition, which governments are inclined to do, the unemployment rate can be moved up or, more usually, down by several percentage points.
	The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and other international organisations produce standardised unemployment rates which differ from national figures but which provide a consistent basis for cross-country comparisons. The 1998 figures in Table 5.4 show differences between standardised and national rates.

Table 5.4 Unemployment
(Standardised definition, as % of labour force)

	Long-term
Unemployment rate		unemployedo

1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1998b		19871997,

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
USA
EU15
DECD

6.0		8.2

8.8 11.3
7.410.4

6.2		10.2
2.9		7.1
7.5		9.6
2.0		2.6
6.0 10.6
11.121.1
2.0		2.8
0.2		0.9
6.411.2
7.0		7.1
6.410.5
5.8		7.8

for 6 months or more as % of total unemployed.

a Those unemployed b National definition.

Source: DECD.

Total unemployment

6.9

7.2 8.1 7.7 8.9 4.8 10.3
2.1 7.5 15.9
1.5 0.5 6.8 5.4 8.1 6.1

8.5
3.9
9.9
9.5
7.2
11.7
8.2
11.9
3.2
6.9
22.9
8.8
3.5
8.7
5.6
10.7
7.7

8.0		8.1
4.7		6.4
9.511.7
8.3		8.3
5.1		6.3
	11.7		11.3
	9.4		10.7
	11.9		12.1
	4.1		4.9
	4.0		4.2
ls.s ls.s
	8.3		6.5
	4.2		3.9
	6.3		6.2
	4.5		4.5
9.9		10.5
7.1		7.1

28.6		30.7
...		62.0
73.5		60.5
9.4		12.5
24.9		27.2
19.0		29.8
48.2		50.1
66.3		66.3
20.2		21.8
46.5		49.1
62.0		55.5
18.3		33.4
...		28.5
47.9		38.6
8.1		8.7
53.7		51.3
35.6		34.7

Unemployment never drops to zero for various reasons.

	Frictional unemployment. There are always people changing jobs and temporarily recorded as unemployed. Their number might be reduced by better information flows (bringing together vacancies and the unemployed) and training.
		Structural unemployment. This indicates people whose skels

64

~nerr,ployment
andardised rates, % of labour force, 1998

UNEMPLOYMENT AND VACANCIES

st
	,s.
zo

15

,o

s

E cc d`ac1 caJa exec
	C~e~ 			C'a	S.c, P

Source: DECD.

and locations do not match job opportunities, usually because they were trained for industries which are collapsing under competition from modern technology and/or imports. Structural job losses can best be reduced through retraining and improving labour mobility.
Seasonal unemployment. Agriculture, construction and tourism are especially vulnerable to seasonal variation.
Residual unemployment. This is the hard core of people who are virtually unemployable, perhaps owing to their inability to integrate with the modern world.

The natural rate

Economists argue that there is a natural rate of unemployment (NRU) or non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) at which the demand and supply for labour are in balance.
	The basic premise is that an increase in demand can be translated into higher employment only up to the NAIRU, at which point employment stops growing and the higher demand spills over into higher inflation.
	Estimates of the NAIRU are subjective and vary from country to country and over time, depending on the level of minimum wages, benefit rates, payroll taxes, unionisation and demographic factors such as the age structure of the labour force.

The cycle

There is a clear cyclical pattern in unemployment. As demand creases, companies take on more workers and unemployment

65
5 POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

decreases. When there is no more labour available (when the NAIRu is reached), demand bubbles over into inflation or imports. Strong consumer demand is less likely to be inflation, if the unemployment rate is well above the NAIRu rather than close to it. During the mid- and late 1990s, unemployment has continued to decline in America and Britain below the unenl_ ployment rate previously thought to be the NAIRU, with few signs of inflationary pressure. Economists therefore think that the NAIRu has declined in these two countries during the 1990s.

Longer-term trends

Unemployment in the industrial countries started to rise again in the early 1990s. It reached more than 8% of the labour force in 1993 and 1994, and has since fallen back to about 7%. The rate is higher in Europe (10% in 1998) than in America (4.5%), where flexible labour markets and strong economic growth have pulled unemployment down, or Japan (below 3%), where jobs for life are part of the culture.
	The structure of unemployment helps to identify problem areas. In 1998 long-term unemployment (those unemployed for more than six months) was almost half of total unemployment. However, it was lower in Japan (39%) and America (14%).

Other clues

The monthly change in unemployment is a good guide to economic developments. Compare the last 2-3 months with the average change in the same period of the previous year. Most figures are seasonally adjusted, but watch out for the effects of severe weather or industrial disputes.
	Other figures, such as weekly claims for unemployment benefit, job advertisements for help wanted and vacancies, provide useful back-up to unemployment figures.
	Regional unemployment figures provide a guide to structural unemployment since they highlight the relationship between job losses and the location of known twilight industries.

66

FISCAL INDICATORS

"Blessed are the young, for they shall inherit the national debt.
Herbert Hoover

Fiscal indicators are concerned with government revenue and expenditure, which are significant influences on the circular flow of incomes (see pages 40-41). Taxes and duties take money out, while spending is an injection. In any one day or year the American government spends more than any other government, company or other organisation anywhere in the world.
	Fiscal activities allow governments to provide services, redistribute incomes and influence the overall level of economic activity. They are one of the government's tools for controlling the economy. Others include monetary policy (see Chapter 12) and direct intervention and controls over wages, prices and industrial activity.

TAXES
The grabbing hand of government is as rapacious as ever. In 11 of the 15 rich countries in our figure, tax revenues have risen as a share of GDP in the 1990s, according to the OECD. The biggest rise has been in Italy, where taxes are up from 38.90 of GDP in 1990 to 43.5% last year. But the tax burden has also increased in less interventionist economies, such as America and Britain. In four countries the tax share has fallen: Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Japan. Sweden's taxes are down from 55.6% of GDP in 1990 to 53.0% in 1998, but they are still the highest in the table. Taxes in the Netherlands have declined proportionately the most, from 446% Of GDP t0 41.0%.

The Economist, November 13th 1999 (see also figure on next page)
