http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/1998/February/FullReport.txt
 
 Section 1: Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook    
 
 The U.S. economy turned in another excellent performance in 1997.
Growth was strong, the unemployment rate declined to its lowest
level in nearly a quarter-century, and inflation slowed further.
Impressive gains were also made in other important respects: The
federal budget moved toward balance much more quickly than
almost anyone had anticipated; capital investment, a critical
ingredient for long-run growth, rose sharply further; and labor
productivity, the ultimate key to rising living standards, displayed
notable vigor.    
 
 Among the influences that have brought about this favorable
performance are the sound fiscal and monetary policies that have
been pursued in recent years. Budgetary restraint at the federal level
has raised national saving, easing the competition for funds in our
capital markets and thereby encouraging greater private investment.
Monetary policy, for its part, has sought to foster an environment of
subdued inflation and sustainable growth. The experience of recent
years has provided additional evidence that the less households and
businesses need to cope with a rising price level, or worry about the
sharp fluctuations in employment and production that usually
accompany inflationary instability, the more long-term investment,
innovation, and enterprise are enhanced.    
 
 The circumstances that prevailed through most of 1997 required that
the Federal Reserve remain especially attentive to the risk of a pickup
in inflation. Labor markets were already tight when the year began,
and nominal wages had started to rise faster than previously.
Persistent strength in demand over the year led to economic growth
in excess of the expansion of the economy's potential, intensifying the
pressures on labor supplies. In earlier business expansions, such
developments had usually produced an adverse turn in the inflation
trend that, more often than not, was accompanied by a worsening of
economic performance on a variety of fronts, culminating in
recession.    
 
 Robust growth of spending early in the year heightened concerns
among members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
that growing strains on productive resources might touch off a faster
rate of cost and price rise that could eventually undermine the
expansion. Financial market participants seemed to share these
concerns: Intermediate- and long-term interest rates began moving
up in December 1996, effectively anticipating Federal Reserve action.
When the FOMC firmed policy slightly at its March meeting by
raising the intended federal funds rate from 5-1/4 percent to 5-1/2
percent, the market response was small.    
 
 The economy slowed a bit during the second and third quarters, and
inflation moderated further. In addition, the progress being made by
the federal government in reducing the size of the deficit was
becoming more apparent. As a consequence, by the end of
September, longer-term interest rates fell 3/4 percentage point from
their peaks in mid-April, leaving them about 1/4 percentage point
below their levels at the end of 1996. The decline in interest rates
along with continued reports of brisk growth in corporate profits
sparked increases in broad indexes of equity prices of 20 percent to
35 percent between April and September.    
 
 Even with a more moderate pace of growth, labor markets
continued to tighten, generating concern among the FOMC members
over this period that rising costs might trigger a rise in inflation.
Consequently, at its meetings from May through November, the
Committee adopted directives for the conduct of policy that assigned
greater likelihood to the possibility of a tightening of policy than to
the possibility of an easing of policy. Even though the Committee
kept the nominal federal funds rate unchanged, it saw the rise in the
real funds rate resulting from declining inflation expectations,
together with the increase in the exchange value of the dollar, as
providing some measure of additional restraint against the possible
emergence of greater inflation pressures.    
 
 In the latter part of the year, developments in other parts of the
world began to alter the perceived risks attending the U.S. economic
outlook. Foreign economies generally had seemed to be on a
strengthening growth path when the Federal Reserve presented its
midyear monetary policy report to the Congress last July. But over
the remainder of the summer and during the autumn, severe financial
strains surfaced in a number of advanced developing countries in
Asia, weakening somewhat the outlook for growth abroad and thus
the prospects for U.S. exports. Although the circumstances in
individual countries varied, the problems they encountered generally
resulted in severe downward pressures on the foreign exchange
values of their currencies; in many cases, steep depreciations
occurred despite substantial upward movement of interest rates.
Asset values in Asia, notably equity and real estate prices, also
declined appreciably in some instances, leading to losses by financial
institutions that had either invested in those assets or lent against
them; nonfinancial firms began to encounter problems servicing their
obligations. In many instances the debts of nonfinancial and financial
firms were denominated in dollars and unhedged. Concerted
international efforts to bring economic and financial stability to the
region are under way, and some progress has been made, but it is
evident that in several of the affected economies the process of
adjustment will be painful. Meanwhile, economic activity in Japan
stagnated, in part because of the developments elsewhere in East
Asia, and the weaknesses in the Japanese financial system became
more apparent.    
 
 The steep depreciations of many Asian currencies contributed to a
substantial further appreciation of the U.S. dollar. Measured against
a broad set of currencies that includes those of the advanced
developing countries of Asia, the exchange value of the dollar,
adjusted for relative consumer prices, has moved up about 8 percent
since October and has increased about 16 percent from its level at the
end of 1996. The dollar has also appreciated, on balance, against an
index of currencies of the G-10 (Group of Ten) industrial countries;
this G-10 trade-weighted index of dollar exchange rates is up about
13 percent in nominal terms since the end of 1996.    
 
 The difficulties in Asia contributed to additional declines of 1/4 to
1/2 percentage point in the yields on intermediate- and long-term
Treasury securities in the United States between mid-autumn and the
end of the year. These decreases were due in part to an international
flight to the safe haven of dollar assets, but they also reflected
expectations that these difficulties would exert a moderating
influence on the growth of aggregate demand and inflation in the
United States. Equity prices were quite volatile but showed little
trend in the fourth quarter. In light of the ongoing difficulties in Asia
and the possible effects on the United States, the FOMC not only left
interest rates unchanged in December, but shifted its instructions to
the Manager of the System Open Market Account to symmetry
between ease and tightening in the near term.    
 
 Some spillover from the problems in Asia has recently begun to
appear in reports on business activity in the United States. Customers
in the advanced developing countries reportedly have canceled some
of the orders they had previously placed with U.S. firms, and
companies more generally are expressing concerns about the
possibilities of both reduced sales to Asia and more intense price
competition here as the result of the sharp changes in exchange rates.
Nonetheless, the available statistics suggest on balance that overall
growth of output and employment has remained brisk in the early
part of 1998.    
 
 Confronted with the marked cross-currents described
above--involving both upside and downside risks to the growth of
output and prospects for inflation--the FOMC earlier this month once
again chose to hold its federal funds rate objective unchanged. In
credit markets, interest rates have fallen further this year as the
effects of the Asian turmoil seemed even more likely to restrain any
tendencies toward unsustainable growth and greater inflation in the
United States. With interest rates lower and the negative effects of
the Asian problems seen by market participants as mostly limited to
particular sectors, broad indexes of equity prices have risen
appreciably, many to new highs.    
 
 
 Economic Projections for 1998    
 
 The outlook for 1998 is clouded with a greater-than-usual degree of
uncertainty. Part of that uncertainty is a reflection of the financial and
economic stresses that have developed in Asia, the full consequences
of which are difficult to judge. But there are some other significant
question marks as well, many of them growing out of the surprising
performance of the U.S. economy in 1997: Growth was considerably
stronger and inflation considerably lower than Federal Reserve
officials and most private analysts had anticipated.    
 
 Some of the key forces that gave rise to this favorable performance
can be readily identified. An ongoing capital spending boom,
encouraged in part by declining prices of high-technology equipment,
provided stimulus to aggregate demand and at the same time created
the additional capacity to help meet that demand. A further jump in
labor productivity that was fueled partly by the buildup of capital
helped firms overcome the production and pricing challenges posed
by tight labor markets. A surprisingly robust stock market bolstered
the finances of households and enabled them to spend more freely.
Falling world oil prices reduced the prices of petroleum products and
helped hold down the prices of other energy-intensive goods. Finally,
a rising dollar imposed additional restraint on inflation, as prices of
imported goods fell appreciably. Circumstances as favorable as those
of 1997 are not likely to persist, although several elements in the
recent mix could help maintain, for some time, a more favorable
economic performance than historical relationships would suggest.    
 
 In assessing the situation, the members of the Board of Governors
and the Reserve Bank presidents, all of whom participate in the
deliberations of the FOMC, think that the most likely outcome for
1998 will be one of moderate growth, low unemployment, and low
inflation. Most of them have placed their point estimates of the rise in
real GDP from the fourth quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of
1998 in the range of 2 percent to 2-3/4 percent. The civilian
unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 1998 is expected to be at
about its recent level. For the most part, the forecasts have the total
CPI for all urban consumers rising between 1-3/4 percent and 2-1/4
percent this year. These predictions do not differ appreciably from
those recently put forth by the Administration.    
 
 Although developments in Asia over the past few months have not
yet affected aggregate U.S. economic performance in a measurable
way, these influences will likely become more visible in coming
months. Growth of U.S. exports is expected to be restrained by
weaknesses in Asian economies and by the lagged effects of the
appreciation of the dollar since 1995. Moreover, with the rise in the
dollar's value making imports less expensive, some U.S. businesses
and consumers will likely switch from domestic to foreign sources
for some of their purchases. But the timing and magnitude of these
developments are hard to predict.    
 
 In contrast to the slower growth that seems to be in prospect for
exports, domestic spending seems likely to maintain considerable
strength in coming quarters. Households as a group are quite upbeat
in their assessments of their personal finances--as might be expected
in conjunction with expanding job opportunities, rising incomes, and
huge gains in wealth. Recently, many households have taken
advantage of lower long-term interest rates by refinancing their home
mortgages, and this will provide a little additional wherewithal for
spending. Moreover, the decline in mortgage rates is also bolstering
housing construction.    
 
 Business outlays for fixed investment seem likely to advance at a
relatively brisk pace in the coming year, although gains as large as
those of the past couple of years may be difficult to match. Outlays
for computers, which have dominated the investment surge of the
past few years, should climb substantially further as businesses press
ahead with new investment in the latest technologies, encouraged in
part by ongoing price declines. With labor markets tight, firms
continue to see capital investment as the key in efforts to increase
efficiency and maintain competitiveness. Internally generated funds
remain adequate to cover the bulk of businesses' investment outlays,
and those firms turning to the debt and equity markets are most often
finding financing generously available on good terms. Inventory
growth will likely put less pressure on business cash flow this year;
after adding to stocks at a substantial clip in 1997, businesses seem
likely to scale back such investment somewhat, especially as they
perceive a moderation in sales increases.    
 
 The Federal Reserve policymakers' forecasts of the average
unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 1998 are mostly around
4-3/4 percent. The persistence for another year of this degree of
tightness in the labor market means that firms will likely continue to
face difficulties in finding workers and that hiring and retaining
workers could become more costly. Indeed, there are indications that
wage inflation picked up further at the end of last year.
Improvements in labor productivity have become more sizable in the
past couple of years, and if such gains can be extended, wage
increases of the magnitude of those of 1997 need not translate into
greater price inflation. The more rapid growth in productivity is
consistent with the high level of capital investment in recent years,
but the extent to which the trend in productivity has picked up is still
uncertain. Furthermore, if momentum in nominal wages continues to
build, the pay increases will eventually squeeze profit margins and
place upward pressures on prices, even with exceptional productivity
gains. The strains in labor markets therefore constitute an ongoing
inflationary risk that will have to be monitored closely.    
 
 In the near term, however, there are several factors that should
lessen the risk of a step-up in inflation. Manufacturing capacity
remains ample, and bottlenecks are not hampering production. The
recent appreciation of the dollar should damp inflation both because
of falling import prices and because the added competition from
imports may induce domestic producers to hold down prices. Oil
prices have weakened considerably since the latter part of 1997 in
response to abundant supplies, the softening of demand in Asia, and a
mild winter. Ample supplies and the prospect of softer global demand
have been depressing the prices of many other commodities, both in
agriculture and in industry. Perhaps most important, as the low level
of inflation that has prevailed in recent years gets built into wage
agreements, other contracts, and individuals' inflation expectations, it
will provide an inertial force helping sustain the favorable price
performance for a time.    
 
 Although many of the factors currently placing restraint on inflation
are not necessarily long lasting, the Committee judged that their
effect in 1998 would about offset the pressures from tight labor
markets. Consequently, the Board members and Reserve Bank
presidents anticipate that the rate of price inflation will change little
this year. Again in 1998, the FOMC will be monitoring a variety of
price measures in addition to the CPI for indications of changes in
inflation and will be assessing movements in the CPI in the context of
ongoing technical improvements by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
that are likely to damp the reported 1998 rise in that index.    
 
 
 Money and Debt Ranges for 1998    
 
 In establishing the ranges for growth of broad measures of money
over 1998, the Committee recognized the considerable uncertainty
that still exists about the behavior of the velocities of these
aggregates. The velocity of M3 (the ratio of nominal GDP to the
monetary aggregate) in particular has proved difficult to predict. Last
year, the growth of this aggregate relative to spending was affected
by the rapid increase in depository credit and by the way in which
that increase was funded, as well as by the changing cash
management practices of corporations, which have been using the
services of institution-only money funds in M3. These factors
boosted M3 growth last year to 8-3/4 percent, 3 percentage points
faster than nominal GDP--an unusually large decline in M3 velocity.
Going forward, it seems likely that M3 growth will continue to be
buoyed by robust credit growth at depositories and continuing shifts
in cash management. Thus, its velocity is likely to decline further,
though the amount of decline is difficult to predict.    
 
 The relationship of M2 to spending in recent years has come back
more into line with historical patterns in which the velocity of M2
tended to be fairly constant, except for the effects of the changing
opportunity cost of M2--the spread between yields that savers could
earn holding short-term market instruments and those that they could
earn holding M2. In the early 1990s, M2 velocity departed from this
pattern, rising substantially and atypically. Even after the unusual
shift of the early 1990s died out, M2 velocity continued to drift
somewhat higher from 1994 into 1997. That drift probably reflected
some continued, albeit more moderate, redirection of savings into
bond and equity markets, especially through the purchase of mutual
funds. However, last year the drift abated. There was little change,
on balance, in the opportunity cost of holding M2, and M2 velocity
also was about unchanged, as M2 grew 5-1/2 percent, nearly the
same as nominal GDP. Nevertheless, the upward drift could resume
in the years ahead as financial innovations or perceptions of attractive
returns lead households to further shift their savings away from M2
balances. Or velocity might be pushed downward if volatility or
setbacks in bond and stock markets were to lead investors to seek
the safety of M2 assets, which have stable principal.    
 
 In light of the uncertainties about the behavior of velocities, the
Committee followed its practice of recent years and established the
ranges for 1998 not as expectations for actual money growth, but
rather as benchmarks for M2 and M3 behavior that would be
consistent with sustained price stability, assuming velocity change in
line with pre-1990 historical experience. Thus, the ranges for
fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter growth are unchanged from those in
1997: 1 percent to 5 percent for M2, and 2 percent to 6 percent for
M3. Given the central tendency of the Committee's forecast for
growth of nominal GDP of 3-3/4 percent to 4-1/2 percent, M2 is
likely to be in the range, perhaps in the upper half, if short-term
interest rates do not change much and velocity continues recent
patterns. For M3, however, a continuation of recent velocity
behavior could imply growth around the upper end of, if not above,
the price-stability range.    
 
 Debt of the nonfinancial sectors grew 4-3/4 percent in 1997, near
the middle of the range of 3 percent to 7 percent established by the
Committee last February. As with the monetary aggregates, the
Committee has left the range for debt unchanged for 1998. The range
it has chosen encompasses the likely growth of debt given Committee
members' forecasts of nominal GDP. Except for the 1980s, the
growth of debt has tended to be reasonably in line with the growth of
nominal GDP.    
 
 Although the ranges for money and debt are not set as targets for
monetary policy in 1998, the behavior of these variables, interpreted
carefully, can at times provide useful information about the economy
and the workings of the financial markets. The Committee will
continue to monitor the movements of money and debt--along with a
wide variety of other financial and economic indicators--to inform its
policy deliberations.    
 


Section 2: Economic and Financial Developments in 1997 and Early
1998    

The past year has been an exceptionally good one for the U.S.
economy. Initial estimates indicate that real GDP increased nearly 4
percent over the four quarters of 1997. Household and business
expenditures continued to rise rapidly, owing in part to supportive
financial conditions, including a strong stock market, ample
availability of credit, and, from April onward, declining
intermediate- and long-term interest rates. In the aggregate, private
domestic spending on consumption and investment rose nearly 5
percent on an inflation-adjusted basis. The strength of spending,
along with a further sizable appreciation of the foreign exchange
value of the U.S. dollar, brought a surge of imports, the largest in
many years. Export growth, while lagging that of imports, also was
substantial despite the appreciation of the dollar and the emergence
after midyear of severe financial difficulties in several foreign
economies, particularly among the advanced developing countries
in Asia.    

Meanwhile, inflation slowed from the already reduced rates of the
previous few years. Although wages and total hourly compensation
accelerated in a tight labor market, the inflationary impulse from
that source was more than offset by other factors, including rising
competition from imports, the price restraint from increased
manufacturing capacity, and a sizable gain in labor productivity.    


The Household Sector    

Consumption Spending, Income, and Saving. Bolstered by
increases in income and wealth, personal consumption expenditures
rose substantially during 1997--about 3-3/4 percent, according to
the initial estimate. Expenditures strengthened for a wide variety of
durable goods. Real outlays on home computers continued to soar,
rising even faster than they did over the previous few years.
Strength also was reported in purchases of furniture and home
appliances--products that tend to do well when home sales are
strong. Consumer expenditures on motor vehicles rose moderately,
on net, more than reversing the small declines of the previous two
years. Real expenditures on services increased more than 4 percent
in 1997, the largest gain of recent years. Personal service categories
such as recreation, transportation, and education recorded large
increases. Consumers also boosted their outlays for business
services, including outlays related to financial transactions.       

Real disposable personal income--after-tax income adjusted for
inflation--is estimated to have increased about 3-3/4 percent during
1997, a gain that was exceeded on only one occasion in the
previous decade. Income was boosted this past year by sizable gains
in wages and salaries and by another year of large increases in
dividends.    

Measured in terms of annual averages, the personal saving rate fell
further in 1997, according to current estimates. The 1997 average
of 3.8 percent was about 1/2 percentage point below the 1996
average and roughly a full percentage point below the 1995
average. It also was the lowest annual reading in several decades.
Various surveys of households show consumers to have become
increasingly optimistic about prospects for the economy, and this
rising degree of optimism may have led them to spend more freely
from current income. Support for additional spending came from
the further rise in the stock market, as the capital gains accruing to
households increased the chances of their meeting longer-run net
worth objectives even as they consumed a larger proportion of
current income.    

Residential Investment. Preliminary data indicate that real
residential investment increased nearly 6 percent during 1997. Real
outlays for the construction of new single-family structures rose
moderately, and outlays for the construction of multifamily units
continued to recover from the extreme lows that were reached
earlier in the decade. Real outlays for home improvements and
brokers' commissions, categories that have a combined weight of
more than 35 percent in total residential investment, moved up
substantially from the final quarter of 1996 to the final quarter of
1997. Spending on mobile homes, a small part of the total, also
advanced.    

The indicators of single-family housing activity were almost
uniformly strong during the year. Sales of houses surged, driven by
declines in mortgage interest rates and the increasingly favorable
economic circumstances of households. Annual sales of new
single-family houses were up about 5-1/2 percent from the number
sold in the preceding year, and sales of existing homes moved up
about 3 percent. House prices moved up more quickly than prices
in general. Responding to the strong demand, starts of new
single-family units remained at a high level, only a touch below that
of 1996; the annual totals for single-family units have now exceeded
1 million units for six consecutive years, putting the current
expansion in single-family housing construction nearly on a par with
that of the 1980s in terms of longevity and strength. In January of
this year, starts of and permits for single-family units were both
quite strong.    

Starts of multifamily units increased in 1997 for the fourth year in a
row and were about double the record low of 1993. The increased
construction of these units was supported by a firming of rents,
abundant supplies of credit, and a reduction in vacancy rates in
some markets. The national vacancy rate came down only slightly,
however, and it has reversed only a portion of the sharp run-up that
took place in the 1980s. This January, starts of multi-family units
fell back to about the 1997 average after having surged to an
exceptionally high level in the fourth quarter.    

The home-ownership rate--the number of households that own their
dwellings divided by the total number of households--moved up
further in 1997, to about 65-3/4 percent, a historical high. The rate
had fallen in the 1980s but has risen almost 2 percentage points in
this decade.    

Household Finance. Household net worth appears to have grown
roughly $3-1/2 trillion during 1997, ending at its highest multiple
relative to disposable personal income on record. Most of this
increase in net worth was the result of upward revaluations of
household assets rather than additional saving. In particular, capital
gains on corporate equities accounted for about three-fourths of the
increase in net worth. Flows of household assets into mutual funds,
pensions, and other vehicles for holding equities indirectly were
exceeded by outflows from directly held equities.    

Household borrowing not backed by real estate, including credit
card balances, auto loans, and other consumer credit, increased
4-3/4 percent in 1997. These obligations grew at double-digit rates
in 1994 and 1995 but have slowed fairly steadily since then.
Mortgage borrowing, by contrast, has experienced relatively muted
swings in growth during the current expansion. Home mortgages
are estimated to have grown 7 percent last year, only a bit slower
than in 1996. Within this category of credit, however, home equity
loans have advanced sharply, reflecting in part the use of these
loans in refinancing and consolidating credit card and other
consumer obligations.    

An element in the slowing of consumer credit growth may have
been assessments by some households that they were reaching the
limits of their capacity for carrying debt and by some lenders that
they needed to tighten selectively their standards for granting new
loans. In the mid-1990s, the percentage of household income
required to meet debt obligations rose to the upper end of its
historical range, in large part because of a sharp rise in credit card
debt. Between 1994 and 1996 personal bankruptcies grew at more
than a 20 percent annual rate, to some extent because of
households' rising debt burden; a change in the federal bankruptcy
law and a secular trend toward associating less social stigma with
bankruptcy also may have contributed. Over the same period,
delinquency and charge-off rates on consumer loans increased
significantly.    

Last year, however, because the growth of household debt only
slightly outpaced that of income while interest rates drifted lower,
the household debt-service burden did not change. Reflecting, in
part, the stability of the aggregate household debt burden,
delinquency rates on many segments of consumer credit plateaued,
although charge-off rates generally continued to rise somewhat.
Personal bankruptcies advanced again last year but showed some
signs of leveling off in the third quarter.       

Some of the apparent leveling out of household debt-repayment
problems may also have resulted from efforts by lenders to stem the
growth of losses on consumer loans. For the past two years, a large
percentage of the respondents to the Federal Reserve's quarterly
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
have reported tightened standards on consumer loans. But the
percentages reporting tightening have fallen a bit in the last few
surveys, suggesting that many banks feel that they have now altered
their standards sufficiently.   

Although banks pulled back a bit from consumer lending, most
households had little trouble obtaining credit in 1997. Bank
restraint has most commonly taken the form of imposing lower
credit limits or raising finance charges on outstanding balances;
credit card solicitations continued at a record pace. Furthermore,
many respondents to the Federal Reserve's January 1998 survey of
loan officers said their banks had eased terms and standards on
home equity loans, providing consumers easier access to an
alternative source of finance.    

Mortgage rates fell last month to levels that led many households to
apply for loan refinancing. When households refinance, they may
choose among options that have differing implications for cash
flow, household balance sheets, and spending. Some households
may decide to reduce their monthly payments, keeping the size of
their mortgages unchanged. Others may keep their monthly
payments unchanged, either speeding up their repayments or
increasing their mortgages and taking out cash in the process,
perhaps to augment current expenditures. In any case, the wave of
refinancings is likely having only a small effect on the overall
economy because the current difference between the average rate
on outstanding mortgages and the rate on new ones is not very
large.    


The Business Sector    

Investment Expenditures. Adjusted for inflation, businesses' outlays
for fixed investment rose about 8 percent during 1997 after gaining
about 12 percent during 1996. Spending continued to be spurred by
rapid growth of the economy, favorable financial conditions,
attractive purchase prices for new equipment, and optimism about
the future. Business outlays for equipment, which account for more
than three-fourths of total business fixed investment, moved up
about 12 percent this past year, making it the fourth year of the last
five in which the annual gains have exceeded 10 percent. As in
previous years of the expansion, real investment rose fastest for
computers, the power of which continued to advance rapidly at the
same time their prices continued to decline. Spending also moved
up briskly for many other types of equipment, including
communications equipment, commercial aircraft, industrial
machinery, and construction machinery.    

Real outlays for nonresidential construction, the remaining portion
of business fixed investment, declined somewhat in 1997 after
moving up in each of the four previous years. Construction of office
buildings continued to increase in 1997, but sluggishness was
apparent in the expenditure data for many other types of structures.
Nonetheless, a tone of underlying firmness was apparent in other
indicators of market conditions. Vacancy rates declined, for
example, and rents seemed to be picking up. In some areas of the
country, more builders have been putting up new office buildings on
"spec"--that is, undertaking new construction before occupants
have been lined up. The new projects are apparently being spurred
to some degree by the ready availability of financing.    

Business inventory investment picked up considerably in 1997.
According to the initial estimate, the level of inventories held by
nonfarm businesses rose about 5 percent in real terms over the
course of the year after increasing roughly 2 percent in 1996.
Accumulation was especially rapid in the commercial aircraft
industry, in which production has been ramped up in response to a
huge backlog of orders for new jets. With the rate of inventory
growth outpacing the growth of final sales last year, the
stock-to-sales ratio in the nonfarm sector ticked up slightly, after a
small decline in the preceding year. Although inventory
accumulation does not seem likely to persist at the pace of 1997,
businesses in general do not appear to be uncomfortable with the
levels of stocks that they have been carrying.    

Corporate Profits and Business Finance. The economic profits of
U.S. corporations (book profits after inventory valuation and
capital consumption adjustments) increased at more than a 14
percent annual rate over the first three quarters of 1997, and profits
of nonfinancial corporations from their domestic operations grew at
a 13-1/2 percent annual rate. In the third quarter, nonfinancial
corporate profits amounted to nearly 14 percent of that sector's
nominal output, up from 7-1/4 percent in 1982 and the highest
share since 1969. The elevated profit share reflects both the high
level of cash flow before interest costs, which also stands at a
multiyear peak relative to output, and the reductions in interest
costs that have taken place in the 1990s. Fourth-quarter profit
announcements indicate that year-over-year growth in earnings was
fairly strong; few corporations reported that they had experienced
much fallout yet from the events in Asia, but many warned that
profits in the first half of 1998 will be significantly affected.    

Despite the rapid growth in profits, the financing gap for
nonfinancial corporations--capital expenditures less internal cash
flow--widened, reflecting the strong expansion of spending on
capital equipment and inventories. Furthermore, on net, firms
continued to retire a large volume of equity, adding further to
borrowing needs, as substantial gross issuance was swamped by
stock repurchases and merger-related retirements. Given these
financing requirements, the growth of nonfinancial corporate debt
picked up to more than a 7 percent rate last year.    

With the debt of nonfinancial corporations advancing briskly, the
ratio of their interest payments to cash flow was about unchanged
last year, after several years of decline that had left it at quite a low
level. Consequently, measures of debt-repayment difficulties also
were very favorable last year: The default rate on corporate bonds
remained extremely low, and the number of upgrades of debt about
equaled the number of downgrades. Similarly, only small
percentages of business loans at banks were delinquent or charged
off. The rate of business bankruptcies increased a bit but was still
fairly low.    

Businesses continued to find credit amply supplied at advantageous
terms last year. The spread between yields on investment-grade
bonds and yields on Treasury securities of similar maturities
remained narrow, varying only a little during the year. The spreads
on below-investment-grade bonds fell over the year, touching new
lows before widening a bit in the fall and early this year; the
widening occurred in large part because these securities benefited
less from the flight to U.S. assets in response to events in Asia than
did Treasury securities. Banks also appeared eager to lend to
businesses. Large percentages of the respondents to the Federal
Reserve's surveys, citing stiff competition as the reason, said they
had eased terms--particularly spreads--on business loans last year.
Much smaller percentages reported having eased standards on these
loans. The high ratios of stock prices to earnings suggest that
equity finance was also quite cheap last year. Nevertheless, the
market for initial public offerings of equity was cooler than in
1996--new issues were priced below the expected range more often
than above it, and first-day trading returns were smaller on average. 
  

The pickup in business borrowing was widespread across funding
sources. Outstanding commercial paper, which had declined a bit in
1996, posted strong growth in 1997, as did bank business loans.
Gross issuance of bonds was extremely high, particularly bonds
with ratings below investment grade. Such lower-rated bonds made
up nearly half of all issuance, a new record. Although sales of new
investment-grade bonds slowed a bit in the fall, corporations were
apparently waiting out the market volatility at that time, and
issuance picked back up in January. Banks, real estate investment
trusts, and commercial-mortgage-backed securities were the most
significant sources of funds for income properties--residential
apartments and commercial buildings--the financing of which
expanded further last year.    


The Government Sector    

Federal Expenditures, Receipts, and Finance. Nominal outlays in
the unified budget increased about 2-1/2 percent in fiscal year 1997
after moving up 3 percent in fiscal 1996. Fiscal 1997 was the sixth
consecutive year that the growth of spending was less than the
growth of nominal GDP. During that period, spending as a
percentage of nominal GDP fell from about 22-1/2 percent to just
over 20 percent. The set of factors that have combined to bring
about this result includes implementation of fiscal policies aimed at
reducing the deficit, which has helped slow the growth of
discretionary spending and spending on some social and health
services programs, and the strength of the economy, which has
reduced outlays for income support.    

In nominal terms, small to moderate increases were recorded in
most major expenditure categories in fiscal 1997. Net interest
outlays, which have been accounting for about 15 percent of total
unified outlays in recent years, rose only a small amount in 1997, as
did nominal outlays for defense and those for income security.
Expenditures on Medicaid rose moderately for a second year after
having grown very rapidly for many years; spending in this category
has been restrained of late by the strong economy, the low rate of
inflation in the medical area, and policy changes in the Medicaid
program. Policy shifts and the strong economy also cut into outlays
for food stamps, which fell about 10 percent in fiscal 1997. By
contrast, spending on Medicare continued to rise at about three
times the rate of total federal outlays. Growth of outlays for social
security also exceeded the rate of rise of total expenditures.    

Real federal outlays for consumption and gross investment, the part
of federal spending that is counted in GDP, were unchanged, on
net, from the last quarter of 1996 to the final quarter of 1997. Real
outlays for defense, which account for about two-thirds of the
spending for consumption and investment, declined slightly,
offsetting a small increase in nondefense outlays. Because of much
larger declines in most other recent years, the level of real defense
outlays at the end of 1997 was down about 22 percent from its
level at the end of the 1980s; total real outlays for consumption and
investment dropped about 14 percent over that period.    

Federal receipts rose faster than nominal GDP for a fifth
consecutive year in fiscal 1997; receipts were 19-3/4 percent of
GDP last year, up from 17-3/4 percent in fiscal 1992. The ratio
tends to rise during business expansions, mainly because of cyclical
increases in the share of profits in nominal GDP. In the past couple
of years, the ratio also has been boosted by the tax increases
included in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, by a rising
income share of high-income taxpayers, and by receipts from
surging capital gains realizations, which raise the numerator of the
ratio but not the denominator because capital gains realizations are
not part of GDP. In fiscal 1997, combined receipts from individual
income taxes and social insurance taxes, which account for about
80 percent of total receipts, moved up about 9-1/2 percent, even
more than in fiscal 1996. Receipts from the taxes on corporate
profits were up about 6 percent in fiscal 1997 after increasing about
9-1/2 percent in the preceding fiscal year. The total rise in receipts
in fiscal 1997, coupled with the subdued rate of increase in nominal
outlays, resulted in a budget deficit of $22 billion, down from $107
billion in the preceding fiscal year.    

With the budget moving close to balance, federal borrowing slowed
sharply last year. The Treasury responded to the
smaller-than-expected borrowing need by reducing sales of bills in
order to keep its auctions of coupon securities predictable and of
sufficient volume to maintain the liquidity of the secondary markets.
The result was an unusually large net redemption of bills, which at
times pushed yields on short-term bills down relative to yields on
other Treasury securities and short-term private obligations.    

Last year saw the first issuance by the Treasury of inflation-indexed
securities. The Treasury sold indexed ten-year notes in January and
April of last year and again this January, and sold five-year notes in
July and October; it also announced it would sell indexed
thirty-year bonds this April. Investor interest in the securities at
those auctions was substantial, with the ratios of received bids to
accepted bids resembling those for nominal securities. As expected,
most of the securities were quickly acquired by final investors, and
the trading volume as a share of the outstanding amount has been
much smaller than for nominal securities.    

An important macroeconomic implication of the reduced federal
deficit is that the federal government has ceased to be a negative
influence on the level of national saving. The improvement in the
federal government's saving position in recent years has more than
accounted for a rise in the total gross saving of households,
businesses, and governments, from about 14-1/2 percent of gross
national product earlier in the decade, when federal government
saving was at a cyclical low and highly negative, to more than 17
percent in the first three quarters of 1997. This rise in domestic
saving, along with increased borrowing from abroad, has financed
the rise in domestic investment in this expansion. Still higher rates
of saving and investment were the norm a couple of decades ago,
when the personal saving rate was a good bit above its level in
recent years.   

State and Local Governments. The real outlays of state and local
governments for consumption and investment moved up about 2
percent over the four quarters of 1997, similar to the average since
the start of the 1990s. Investment expenditures, which have grown
about 2-1/2 percent per annum this decade, rose at only half that
pace in 1997, according to the initial estimate. However, real
consumption expenditures increased 2-1/4 percent last year, a touch
above the average for the decade. Compensation of government
employees, which accounts for about three-fifths of real
consumption and investment expenditures, rose about 1-3/4 percent
in 1997 and has increased at an annual rate of only about 1-1/4
percent since the end of the 1980s.    

The efforts of state and local governments to hold down their labor
expenses are also reflected in the recent data on nominal wages and
hourly compensation. According to the employment cost indexes,
hourly compensation of the workers employed by state and local
governments increased 2-1/4 percent in 1997, a little less than in
1996 and the smallest annual increase in the seventeen-year history
of the series. The increase in the average hourly wage of state and
local employees amounted to about 2-3/4 percent in 1997, roughly
the same as the gain in 1996. The average hourly cost of the benefit
packages provided to state and local employees rose only 1-1/4
percent, a percentage point less than the increase in 1996.    

With costs contained and receipts continuing to rise with the
growth of the economy, financial pressures that were evident
among state and local governments earlier in the expansion have
diminished. The increased breathing room in the budgets of recent
years is apparent in the consolidated current account of these
governments: Surpluses in that account, excluding those that are
earmarked for social insurance funds, had dipped to a low of about
1-1/2 percent of nominal receipts in 1991, but they have been larger
than 3 percent of receipts in each of the past three years.    

State and local debt expanded about 5-3/4 percent last year after
changing little in 1996 and declining in the two preceding years. In
those earlier years, municipal debt outstanding had been held down
by the retirement of bonds that were "advance refunded" in the
early 1990s. In such operations, funds that had earlier been raised
and set aside were used to refund debt as it became callable. By the
end of 1996, however, the stock of such debt had apparently been
largely worked down.    


External Sector    

Trade and the Current Account. The nominal trade deficit for
goods and services was $114 billion in 1997, little changed from the
$111 billion deficit in 1996. For the first three quarters of the year,
the current account deficit reached $160 billion at an annual rate,
somewhat wider than the 1996 deficit of $148 billion. This
deterioration of the current account largely reflects continued
declines in net investment income, which for the first time recorded
deficits in each of the first three quarters of the year.    

The quantity of imports of goods and services expanded strongly
during 1997--about 13 percent according to preliminary
estimates--as the very rapid growth experienced during the first half
of the year moderated slightly during the second half. The
expansion was fueled by continued vigorous growth of U.S. GDP.
Additional declines in non-oil import prices--related in large part to
the appreciation of the dollar--contributed as well. Of the major
trade categories, increases in imports were sharpest for capital
goods and consumer goods.    

Export growth was also strong in 1997, particularly during the first
half of the year. The quantity of exports of goods and services rose
nearly 11 percent, after a rise of 9-1/4 percent the preceding year.
Despite further appreciation of the dollar, exports accelerated in
response to the strength of economic activity abroad. Output
growth in most of our industrial-country trading partners firmed in
1997 from the moderate rates observed in 1996. Among our
developing-country trading partners, robust growth continued
through much of the year, but the onset of crises in several Asian
economies late in 1997 led to abrupt slowdowns in economic
activity. Growth of exports to Latin American countries and to
Canada was particularly strong. Exports to Western Europe also
increased at a healthy pace.    

Capital Flows. In the first three quarters of 1997, large increases
were reported in both foreign ownership of assets in the United
States and U.S. ownership of assets abroad, reflecting the
continued trend toward the globalization of both financial markets
and the markets for goods. Little evidence of the gathering financial
storm in Asia was apparent in the data on U.S. capital flows
through the end of September. Foreign official assets in the United
States rose $46 billion in the first three quarters of 1997. The
increases were concentrated in the holdings of certain industrial
countries and members of OPEC. Although substantial, these
increases were below the pace for the first three quarters of 1996.    

In contrast, increases in assets held by other foreigners in the first
three quarters of 1997 surpassed those recorded in 1996. In
particular, net purchases of U.S. Treasury securities by private
foreigners rose to $130 billion, net purchases of U.S. corporate and
other bonds reached $96 billion, and net purchases of U.S. stocks
were a record $55 billion. In addition, foreign direct investment in
the United States also posted a new high of $78 billion, as the
strong pace of acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreigners
continued.    

U.S. direct investment abroad in the first three quarters of 1997
also exceeded the 1996 pace, with a record net outflow of $88
billion. U.S. net purchases of foreign securities in the first three
quarters of 1997 were $74 billion, a little below the pace for 1996.
However, net purchases of stocks in Japan and bonds in Latin
America were up substantially. Banks in the United States reported
a large increase in net claims on foreigners in the first quarter but
only a modest increase in the next two quarters combined.    


The Labor Market    

Employment, Productivity, and Labor Supply. More than 3 million
jobs were added to nonfarm payrolls in 1997--a gain of nearly 2-3/4
percent, measured from December to December. Patterns of hiring
mirrored the broadly based gains in output and spending.
Manufacturing, construction, trade, transportation, finance, and
services all exhibited appreciable strength. In manufacturing, the
1997 rise in the job count followed two years of little change.
Elsewhere, the gains in 1997 came on top of substantial increases in
other recent years. Especially rapid increases were posted this past
year in some of the services industries, including computer services,
management services, education, and recreation. Employment at
suppliers of personnel, a category that includes the agencies that
supply help on a temporary basis, also increased appreciably in
1997, but the gains in this category fell considerably short of those
seen in previous years of the expansion. Help-supply firms reported
that shortages of workers were limiting the pace of their expansion. 
  

Labor productivity has risen rapidly over the past two years.
Revised data show the 1996 gain in output per hour in the nonfarm
business sector to have been about 1-3/4 percent, and the increase
in 1997 was larger still--about 2-1/4 percent, according to the first
round of estimates. Although the average rate of productivity
increase since the end of the 1980s still is only a little above 1
percent per year, the data for the past two years provide hopeful
indications that sustained high levels of investment in new
technologies may finally be translating into a stronger trend.   

The civilian unemployment rate fell more than 1/2 percentage point
from the fourth quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of 1997, to an
average of just under 4-3/4 percent. The rate held steady at this
level in January of this year. For most of the past year, the rate has
been running somewhat below the minimum that was reached in the
expansion of the 1980s. A variety of survey data indicate that firms
have had increased difficulty filling jobs.    

After moving up a step in 1996, the labor force participation rate
continued to edge higher in 1997. Without the increment to labor
supply from increased participation over these two years, the
unemployment rate would have fallen to an even lower level.
Changes in the welfare system perhaps contributed to some extent
to the small rise in participation in 1997, although this effect is
difficult to disentangle from the normal tendency of participation to
rise when the labor market is tight. Even though one-third of the
adult population remained outside the labor force in 1997, the vast
majority of those individuals likely were in pursuits that tended to
preclude their workforce participation, such as retirement,
schooling,or housework. The percentage of the working age
population interested in work but not actively seeking it moved
down further in 1997, to 2-1/4 percent in the fourth quarter, a
record low in the history of the series, which began in 1970.    

Wages and Hourly Compensation. According to the employment
cost indexes, hourly compensation in private industry increased 3.4
percent from December of 1996 to December of 1997. This rise
exceeded that of the previous year by 0.3 percentage point and was
0.8 percentage point greater than the increase of 1995. Although
the patterns of change in hourly pay have varied quite a bit by
industry and occupation over the past two years, the overall step-up
seems to have been prompted, in large part, by the tightening of
labor markets. The implementation of a higher minimum wage also
seems to have been a factor in some industries and occupations,
although its impact is difficult to assess precisely.    

The wage and salary component of hourly compensation rose faster
in 1997 than in any previous year of the expansion. Annual
increases in the employment cost index for wages and salaries in
private industry amounted to 2.8 percent in both 1994 and 1995,
but the increases of 1996 and 1997 were 3.4 percent and 3.9
percent respectively. Wages and salaries in the service-producing
industries accelerated nearly a full percentage point in 1997, pushed
up, especially, by sharp pay increases in the finance, insurance, and
real estate sector, in which commissions and bonuses have recently
been boosted by high levels of mortgage refinancing and trading
activity. By contrast, hourly wages in the goods-producing
industries slowed a couple of tenths of a percentage point in 1997;
the annual gains in these industries have been around 3 percent, on
average, in each of the past six years.    

Although the costs of the fringe benefits that companies provide to
their employees also picked up in 1997, the yearly increase of 2.3
percent was not large by historical standards. As in other recent
years, benefit costs in 1997 were restrained by a variety of
influences. Most notably, the price of health care continued to rise
at a subdued pace, and the ongoing strength of the economy limited
the need for payments by firms to state unemployment trust funds.
Even though some firms reported seeing renewed sharp increases in
health care costs during the year, the employment cost data suggest
that most firms still were keeping those costs under fairly tight
control.    

With nominal hourly compensation in almost all industries moving
ahead at a faster pace than inflation, workers' pay generally
increased in real terms, and the real gains were substantial in many
occupations. Indeed, the employment cost index does not capture
some of the forms of compensation that employers have been using
to attract and retain workers--stock options and signing bonuses,
for example.    


Prices    

Indications of a slowing of inflation in 1997 were widespread in the
various measures of aggregate price change. The consumer price
index, which had picked up to more than a 3 percent rate of rise
over the four quarters of 1996, increased slightly less than 2 percent
over the four quarters of 1997 as energy prices turned down and
increases in food prices slowed. The CPI excluding food and
energy--a widely used gauge of the underlying trend of
inflation--rose only 2-1/4 percent in 1997 after increases of 3
percent in 1995 and 2-1/2 percent in 1996. The CPI for
commodities other than food and energy rose about 1/2 percent
over the four quarters of 1997 after moving up slightly more than 1
percent in 1996. Price increases for non-energy services, which
have a much larger weight than commodities in the core CPI, also
slowed a little in 1997; a 3 percent rise during the year was about
1/4 percentage point less than the increase during 1996. Only small
portions of the slowdowns between 1996 and 1997 in the total CPI
and in the CPI excluding food and energy were the result of
technical changes implemented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.\1  
 

Other measures of aggregate price change also decelerated in 1997.
The chain-type price index for gross domestic purchases--the
broadest measure of prices paid by U.S. households, businesses,
and governments--increased about 1-1/2 percent during 1997 after
moving up 2-1/4 percent in 1996. The chain-type price index for
gross domestic product, a measure of price change for the goods
and services produced in this country (rather than the goods and
services purchased), increased 1-3/4 percent in the latest year after
rising 2-1/4 percent in 1996. The steeper slowing of the price
index for aggregate purchases relative to that for aggregate
production was largely a reflection of the prices of imports, which
fell faster in 1997 than in 1996. Falling computer prices were an
important influence on many of these measures of aggregate price
change--more so than on the CPI, which gave small weight to
computers through 1997 but has started weighting them more
heavily this year.    

In real terms, imports of goods and services account for
approximately 15 percent of the total purchases of households,
businesses, and governments located in the United States. But that
figure probably understates the degree of restraint that falling
import prices have imposed on domestic inflation, because the
lower prices for imports also make domestic producers of
competing products less likely to raise prices. Prices have also been
restrained by large additions to manufacturing capacity in this
country, amounting to more than 5 percent in each of the past three
years; this capacity growth helped to stave off the bottlenecks that
so often have developed in the more advanced stages of other
postwar business expansions. A gain in manufacturing production
of more than 6 percent this past year was accompanied by only a
moderate increase in the factory operating rate, which, at year-end,
remained well below the highs reached in other recent expansions
and the peak for this expansion, which was recorded about three
years ago.    

Reflecting the ample domestic supply and the effects of competition
from goods produced abroad, the producer price index for finished
goods declined about 3/4 percent from the fourth quarter of 1996
to the fourth quarter of 1997; excluding food and energy, it rose
only fractionally. Prices of domestically produced materials (other
than food and energy) also rose only slightly, on net. The prices of
raw industrial commodities, many of which are traded in
international markets, declined over the year; the weakness of
prices in these markets was especially pronounced in late 1997,
when the crises in Asia were worsening. Industrial commodity
prices fell further in the first couple of weeks of 1998, but they
since have changed little, on balance. The producer price index fell
sharply in January of this year; the index excluding food and energy
declined slightly.    

After moving up more than 4 percent in 1996, the consumer price
index for food increased only 1-3/4 percent in 1997. Impetus for
the large increase of 1996 had come from a surge in the price of
grain, which peaked around the middle of that year; since then,
grain prices have dropped back considerably. An echo of the
up-and-down price pattern for grains appeared at retail in the form
of sharp price increases for meats, poultry, and dairy products in
1996 followed by small to moderate declines for most of those
products in 1997. Moderate price increases were posted at retail for
most other food categories last year.    

The CPI for energy has traced out an even bigger swing than the
price of food over the past two years--a jump of 7-1/2 percent over
the four quarters of 1996 was followed by a decline of about 1
percent over the four quarters of 1997. As is usually the case in this
sector, the key to these developments was the price of crude oil,
which in 1997 more than reversed the run-up of the preceding year.
Prices of oil have been held down in recent months by ample world
supplies, the economic problems in Asia, and a mild winter.    

Survey data on inflation expectations mostly showed moderate
reductions during 1997 in respondents' views of the future rate of
price increase, and some of the survey data for early 1998 have
shown a more noticeable downward shift in inflation expectations.
A lowering of inflation expectations has long been viewed as an
essential ingredient in the pursuit of price stability, and the recent
data are a sign that progress is still being made in that regard.    


Credit, Money, Interest Rates, and Equity Prices    

Credit and Depository Intermediation. The debt of the domestic
nonfinancial sectors grew at a 4-3/4 percent rate last year,
somewhat below the midpoint of the range established by the
FOMC and less than in 1996, when it grew 5-1/4 percent. The
deceleration was accounted for entirely by the federal component,
which, because of the reduced budget deficit, rose less than 1
percent last year, after having risen 3-3/4 percent in 1996.
Nonfederal debt grew 6 percent, a bit more than in 1996, as the
pickup in business borrowing more than offset the deceleration of
household debt.    

Depository institutions increased their share of credit flows in 1997,
with credit on their books expanding 5-3/4 percent, up appreciably
from growth in 1996. The growth of bank credit, adjusted to
remove the effects of mark-to-market accounting rules, accelerated
to an 8-1/4 percent pace, the largest rise in ten years; and banks'
share of domestic nonfinancial debt outstanding climbed to its
highest level since 1988. Bank credit accelerated in part because
banks' holdings of securities--which had run off in 1995 and had
been flat in 1996--expanded at a brisk pace last year; securities
account for one-fourth of total bank credit. Loans, which make up
the remainder of bank credit, also advanced a bit more quickly last
year than in 1996, though more slowly than in 1995.    

The increase in bank loans occurred despite a net decline in
consumer loans on banks' books resulting both from sharply slower
growth in loans originated by banks and from continued
securitization of those loans. Real estate loans at banks, by contrast,
posted solid growth last year. This category of credit benefited
from a pickup in home mortgages, the rapid growth in home equity
loans, which were substituting in part for consumer loans, an
acceleration in commercial real estate lending, and the acquisition
of thrift institutions by banks. Commercial and industrial loans
expanded considerably last year, reflecting both the general rise in
the demand by businesses for funds and an increase in banks' share
of the nonmortgage business credit market as they competed
vigorously for business loans by easing terms.    

The rapid growth of banks' assets was facilitated by their continued
high profitability and abundance of capital; at the end of the third
quarter, nearly 99 percent of bank assets were at well-capitalized
institutions. Problems with the repayment performance of consumer
loans--which, while not deteriorating further, remained elevated by
historical standards--hurt some banks; however, overall loan
delinquency and charge-off rates stayed quite low, and measures of
banks' profitability persisted at the elevated levels they have
occupied for several years. Profits at a few large bank holding
companies were reduced in the fourth quarter by trading losses
resulting from the events in Asia. Nonetheless, the profits of the
industry as a whole remained robust.    

The profits and capital levels of thrift institutions, like those of
banks, were high last year, and the thrifts also were aggressive
lenders. The outstanding amount of credit extended by thrifts grew
at about a 1-1/2 percent pace last year, but this sluggishness
reflected entirely the acquisitions of thrifts by commercial banks;
among thrifts not acquired during the year, asset growth was similar
to that of banks.    

The Monetary Aggregates. Boosted in part by the need to fund
substantial growth in depository credit, M3 shot up last year,
expanding 8-3/4 percent; this growth was well above the 2 percent
to 6 percent annual range, which was intended to suggest the rate
of growth over the long run consistent with price stability. M3 was
augmented by a shift in sources of funding--mostly at U.S. branches
and agencies of foreign banks--from borrowings from related
offices abroad, which are not included in M3, to large time deposits
issued in the United States, which are. Also contributing to the
strength in M3 was rapid growth in institution-only money funds,
which reflected gains by these funds in the provision of corporate
cash management services. Corporations that manage their own
cash often keep their funds in short-term assets that are not
included in M3.    

Although growth of M2 did not match that of M3, it increased at a
brisk 5-1/2 percent rate last year. As the Committee had
anticipated, the aggregate was somewhat above the upper bound of
its 1 percent to 5 percent annual range, which also had been chosen
to be consistent with expected M2 growth under conditions of price
stability. Because short-term interest rates responded only slightly
to System tightening in March, the opportunity cost of holding
M2--the interest earnings forgone by owning M2 assets rather than
money market instruments such as Treasury bills--was about
unchanged over the year. As M2 grew at about the same rate as
nominal GDP, velocity was also essentially unchanged. The ups and
downs of M2 growth last year mirrored those of the growth in
nominal output. M2 expanded much more slowly in the second
quarter than in the first, consistent with the cooling of nominal GDP
growth and almost unchanged opportunity costs. In the second half
of the year, M2 growth picked up, again pacing the growth of
nominal GDP. In the fall, M2 may also have been boosted a little by
the volatility in equity markets, which may have led some
households to seek the relative safety of M2 assets.    

For several decades before 1990, M2 velocity responded positively
to changes in its opportunity costs and otherwise showed little net
movement over time. This pattern was disturbed in the early 1990s
in part by households' apparent decision to shift funds out of
lower-yielding M2 deposits into higher-yielding stock and bond
mutual funds, which raised M2 velocity even as opportunity costs
were declining. The movements in the velocity of M2 from 1994
into 1997 appear to have again been explained by changes in
opportunity costs, along with some residual upward drift. This drift
suggests that some households may still have been in the process of
shifting their portfolios toward non-M2 assets. There was no
uptrend in velocity over the second half of last year, perhaps
because of the declining yields on intermediate- and long-term debt
and the greater volatility and lower average returns posted by stock
mutual funds. However, given the aberrant behavior of velocity
during the 1990s in general, considerable uncertainty remains about
the relationship between the velocity and opportunity cost of M2 in
the future.    

M1 fell 1-1/4 percent last year. As has been true for the last four
years, the growth of this aggregate was depressed by the adoption
by banks of retail sweep programs, whereby balances in
transactions accounts, which are subject to reserve requirements,
are "swept" into savings accounts, which are not. Sweep programs
benefit depositories by reducing their required reserves, which earn
no interest. At the same time, they do not restrict depositors' access
to their funds for transactions purposes, because the funds are
swept back into transactions accounts when needed. The initiation
of programs that sweep funds out of NOW accounts--until last year
the most common form of retail sweep programs--appears to be
slowing, but sweeps of household demand deposits have picked up,
leaving the estimated total amount by which sweep account
balances increased last year similar to that in 1996. Adjusted for the
initial reduction in transactions accounts resulting from the
introduction of new sweep programs, M1 expanded 6-1/4 percent,
a little above its sweep-adjusted growth in 1996.    

The drop in transactions accounts caused required reserves to fall
7-1/4 percent last year. Despite this decline, the monetary base
grew 6 percent, boosted by a hefty advance in currency. Currency
again benefited from foreign demand, as overseas shipments
continued at the elevated levels seen in recent years. Moreover,
domestic demand for currency expanded sharply in response to the
strong domestic spending.    

The Federal Reserve has been concerned that as the steady decline
in required reserves of recent years is extended, the federal funds
rate may become significantly more volatile. Required reserves are
fairly predictable and must be maintained on only a two-week
average basis. As a result, the unavoidable daily mismatches
between reserves made available through open market operations
and desired reserves typically have been fairly small, and their effect
on the federal funds rate has been muted. However, banks also hold
reserve balances at the Federal Reserve to avoid overdrafts after
making payments for themselves and their customers. This
component of the demand for reserves is difficult to predict, varies
considerably from day to day, and must be fully satisfied each day.
As required reserves have declined, the demand for balances at the
Federal Reserve has become increasingly dominated by these more
changeable daily payment-related needs. Nonetheless, federal funds
volatility did not increase noticeably last year. In part this was
because the Federal Reserve intervened more frequently than in the
past with open market operations of overnight maturity in order to
better match the supply of and demand for reserves each day. In
addition, banks made greater use of the discount window,
increasing the supply of reserves when the market was excessively
tight. Significant further declines in reserve balances, however, do
risk increased federal funds rate volatility, potentially complicating
the money market operations of the Federal Reserve and of the
private sector. One possible solution to this problem is to pay banks
interest on their required reserve balances, reducing their incentive
to avoid holding such balances.    

Interest Rates and Equity Prices. Interest rates on intermediate- and
long-term Treasury securities moved lower, on balance, last year.
Yields rose early in the year as market participants became
concerned that strength in demand would further tighten resource
utilization margins and increase inflation unless the Federal Reserve
took countervailing action. Over the late spring and summer,
however, as growth moderated some and inflation remained
subdued, these concerns abated significantly, and longer-term
interest rates declined. Further reductions came in the latter part of
the year as economic problems mounted in Asia. On balance,
between the end of 1996 and the end of 1997, the yields on ten-year
and thirty-year Treasury bonds fell about 70 basis points. Early this
year, with the economic troubles in Asia continuing, the desire of
investors for less risky assets, along with further reductions in the
perceived risk of strong growth and higher inflation, pushed yields
on intermediate- and long-term Treasury securities down an
additional 25 to 50 basis points, matching their levels of the late
1960s and the early 1970s, when the buildup of inflation
expectations was in its early stages.    

Survey measures of expectations for longer-horizon inflation
generally did move lower last year, but by less than the drop in
nominal yields. As a result, estimates of the real longer-term interest
rate calculated by subtracting these measures of expected inflation
from nominal yields indicate a slight decline in real rates over the
year. In contrast, yields on the inflation-indexed ten-year Treasury
note rose about a quarter percentage point between mid-March
(when market participants seem to have become more comfortable
with the new security) and the end of the year. The market for the
indexed securities is sufficiently small that their yields can fluctuate
temporarily as a result of moderate shifts in supply or demand.
Indeed, much of the rise in the indexed yield came late in the year,
when, in an uncertain global economic environment, investors'
heightened desire for liquidity may have made nominal securities
relatively more attractive.    

With real interest rates remaining low and corporate profits
growing strongly, equities had another good year in 1997, and
major stock indexes rose 20 percent to 30 percent. Although stocks
began the year well, they fell with the upturn in interest rates in
February. As interest rates subsequently declined and earnings
reports remained quite upbeat, the markets again advanced, with
most broad indexes of stock prices reaching new highs in the
spring. Advances were much more modest, on balance, over the
second half of the year. Valuations seemed already to have
incorporated very robust earnings growth, and in October,
deepening difficulties in Asia evidently led investors to lower their
expectations for the earnings of some U.S. firms, particularly  
high-technology firms and money center banks. More rapid price
advances have resumed of late, as interest rates fell further and
investors apparently came to see the earnings consequences of
Asian difficulties as limited.    

Despite the strong performance of earnings and the slower rise of
stock prices since last summer, valuations seem to reflect a
combination of expectations of quite rapid future earnings growth
and a historically small risk premium on equities. The gap between
the market's forward-looking earnings-price ratio and the real
interest rate, measured by the ten-year Treasury rate less a survey
measure of inflation expectations, was at the smallest sustained
level last year in the eighteen-year period for which these data are
available. Declines in this gap generally imply either that expected
real earnings growth has increased or that the risk premium over
the real rate investors use when valuing those earnings has fallen, or
both. Survey estimates of stock analysts' expectations of long-term
nominal earnings growth are, in fact, the highest observed in the
fifteen years for which these data are available. Because inflation
has trended down over the past fifteen years, the implicit forecast of
the growth in real earnings departs even further from past forecasts.
However, even with this forecast of real earnings growth, the
current level of equity valuation suggests that investors are also
requiring a lower risk premium on equities than has generally been
the case in the past, a hypothesis supported by the low risk
premiums evident in corporate bond yields last year.   


International Developments    

The foreign exchange value of the dollar rose during 1997 in terms
of the currencies of most of the United States' trading partners.
From the end of December 1996 through the end of December
1997, the dollar on average gained 13 percent in nominal terms
against the currencies of the other G-10 countries when those
currencies are weighted by multilateral trade shares. In terms of a
broader index of currencies that includes those of most industrial
countries and several developing countries, the dollar on balance
rose nearly 14 percent in real terms during 1997.\2 The trading
desk of the New York Federal Reserve Bank did not intervene in
foreign exchange markets during 1997.         

During the first half of 1997, the dollar appreciated in terms of the
currencies of the other industrial countries, as the continuing
strength of U.S. economic activity raised expectations of further
tightening of U.S. monetary conditions. Concerns about the
implications of the transition to European Monetary Union and
perceptions that monetary policy was not likely to tighten
significantly in prospective member countries also contributed to
the tendency for the dollar to rise in terms of the mark and other
continental European currencies. In response to varying indicators
of the strength of the Japanese expansion, the dollar rose against
the yen early in the year but then moved back down through
midyear.    

The crises in Asian financial markets dominated developments
during the second half of the year and resulted in substantial
appreciation of the dollar in terms of the currencies of Korea and
several countries in Southeast Asia. The dollar also appreciated
against the yen in response to evidence of financial sector fragility
in Japan and faltering Japanese economic activity, which were likely
to be exacerbated by the negative impact of the Asian situation on
Japan. During the first weeks of 1998, the dollar has changed little,
on average, in terms of the currencies of most other industrial
countries, but it has moved down in terms of the yen.    

Pronounced asset-price fluctuations in Southeast Asia began in
early July when the Thai baht dropped sharply immediately
following the decision by authorities to no longer defend the baht's
peg. Downward pressure soon emerged on the currencies and
equity prices of other southeast Asian countries, in particular
Indonesia and Malaysia. Weakening balance sheet positions of
nonfinancial firms and financial institutions, rising debt-service
burdens, and financial market stresses that resulted in part from
policies of pegging local currencies to the appreciating dollar
prompted closer scrutiny of Asian economies. As foreign creditors
came to realize the extent to which these Asian financial systems
were undercapitalized and inadequately supervised, they became
less willing to continue to lend, making it even more difficult for the
Asian borrowers to meet their foreign currency obligations.
Turbulence spread to Hong Kong in October. The depreciation of
currencies elsewhere in Asia, in particular the decision by
Taiwanese authorities to allow some downward adjustment of the
Taiwan dollar, led market participants to question the commitment
of Hong Kong authorities to the peg of the Hong Kong dollar to
the U.S. dollar. In response, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
raised domestic interest rates substantially to defend the peg,
driving down equity prices as a consequence. Near the end of the
year, the crisis spread to Korea, whose economy and financial
system were already vulnerable as a result of numerous
bankruptcies of corporate conglomerates starting in January 1997;
these bankruptcies of major nonfinancial firms further undermined
Korean financial institutions and, combined with the depreciations
in competitor countries, contributed to a loss of investor
confidence. On balance, during 1997 the dollar appreciated
significantly in terms of the Indonesian rupiah (139 percent), the
Korean won (100 percent), and the Thai baht (82 percent), while it
moved up somewhat less in terms of the Taiwan dollar (19 percent)
and was unchanged in terms of the Hong Kong dollar, which
remains pegged to the U.S. dollar. Since year-end, the dollar has
appreciated significantly further, on balance, in terms of the
Indonesian rupiah and is little changed in terms of the Korean won.  
 

The emergence of the financial crisis is causing a marked slowdown
in economic activity in these Asian economies. During the first half
of last year, real output continued to expand in most of these
countries at about the robust rates enjoyed in 1996. Since the onset
of the crisis, domestic demand in these countries has been greatly
weakened by disruption in financial markets, substantially higher
domestic interest rates, sharply reduced credit availability, and
heightened uncertainty. In addition, macroeconomic policy has been
tightened somewhat in Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Korea in connection with international support packages from the
International Monetary Fund and other international financial
institutions, and in connection with bilateral aid from individual
countries. Announcement of agreement with the IMF on the
support packages temporarily buoyed asset markets in each
country, but concerns about the willingness or ability of
governments to undertake difficult reforms and to achieve the
stated macroeconomic goals remained. Additional measures to
tighten the Korean program were announced in mid-December and
included improved reserve management by the Bank of Korea,
removal of certain interest rate ceilings, and acceleration of capital
account liberalization and financial sector restructuring. With the
encouragement of the authorities of the G-7 and other countries,
banks in industrial countries have generally rolled over the majority
of their foreign-currency-denominated claims on Korean banks
during early 1998, as a plan for financing the external obligations of
Korean financial institutions was being formulated. After the
announcement on January 28 of an agreement in principle for the
exchange of existing claims on Korean banks for restructured loans
carrying a guarantee from the Korean government, the won
stabilized. In the case of Indonesia, the support package was
renegotiated and reaffirmed with the IMF in mid-January, though
important elements of the approach of the Indonesian authorities
remain in question as this report is submitted.   

Signs that adjustment is proceeding within these Asian economies
are already evident. For example, Thailand and Korea have
registered strong improvements in their trade balances in recent
months. Equity prices have recovered in Thailand, Indonesia, and
Korea as well. At the same time, signs of rising inflation are
beginning to emerge. In particular, consumer prices have
accelerated in recent months in these three countries.    

Spillover of the financial crisis to the economies of China, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan has been limited to date. Steps to maintain the
peg in Hong Kong have resulted in elevated interest rates, sharply
lower equity prices, and increased uncertainty. However, in
Taiwan, equity prices on balance rose nearly 18 percent in 1997 and
have risen somewhat further so far this year. Real output growth in
these three economies remained robust early in 1997 but may have
slowed somewhat in China and Hong Kong in recent months.    

Financial markets in some Latin American countries also came
under pressure in reaction to the intensification of the crises in Asia
in late 1997. After remaining quite stable earlier in the year, the
Mexican peso dropped about 8 percent in terms of the U.S. dollar
in late October; since then, it has changed little, on balance. In
Brazil, exchange market turbulence abroad lowered market
confidence in the authorities' ability to maintain that country's
managed exchange rate regime; in response, short-term interest
rates were raised 20 percentage points. The Brazilian exchange rate
regime and the peg of the Argentine peso to the dollar have held.
Real output growth in Mexico and Argentina remained healthy
during 1997. In Brazil, growth fluctuated sharply during the year,
with the high domestic interest rates and tighter macroeconomic
policy stance that were put in place late in the year weakening
domestic demand. During 1997, consumer price inflation slowed
significantly in Mexico and Brazil and remained very low in
Argentina.    

In Japan, the economic expansion faltered in the second quarter as
the effects on domestic demand of the April increase in the
consumption tax exceeded expectations; in addition, crises in many
of Japan's Asian trading partners late in the year weakened external
demand and heightened concerns about the fragility of Japan's
financial sector. The dollar rose about 10 percent against the yen
during the first four months of 1997 as economic activity in the
United States strengthened relative to that in Japan and as interest
rate developments, including the FOMC policy move in March,
favored dollar assets. These gains were temporarily reversed in May
and June as market attention focused on the growing Japanese
external surplus and tentative indications of improving real activity.
However, subsequent evidence of disappointing output growth,
revelations of additional problems in the financial sector, and
concerns about the implications of turmoil elsewhere in Asia for the
Japanese economy contributed to a rise in the dollar in terms of the
yen during the second half of the year. On net, the dollar
appreciated nearly 13 percent against the yen during 1997; so far in
1998, it has moved back down slightly, on balance.    

In Germany and France, output growth rose in 1997 from its
modest 1996 pace, boosted in both countries by the strong
performance of net exports. Nevertheless, the dollar rose in terms
of the mark and other continental European currencies through
midyear, responding not only to stronger U.S. economic activity
but also to concerns about the timetable for launching European
Monetary Union (EMU), the process of the transition to a single
currency, and the policy resolve of the prospective members. Later
in the year the dollar moved back down slightly and then fluctuated
narrowly in terms of the mark, as investors concluded that the
transition to EMU was likely to be smooth, with the euro
introduced on time on January 1, 1999, and with a broad
membership. On balance, the dollar rose about 17 percent against
the mark during 1997 and has varied little since then.    

In the United Kingdom and Canada, real output growth was
vigorous in 1997. All the components of U.K. domestic demand
continued to expand strongly. In Canada, more robust private
consumption spending and less fiscal restraint boosted real GDP
growth from its moderate 1996 pace. Central bank official lending
rates were raised in both countries during the year to address the
threat of rising inflation. The value of the pound eased slightly in
terms of the dollar over the year, whereas the Canadian dollar fell
more than 4 percent in terms of the U.S. dollar. Much of the
movement in the Canadian dollar came during the fourth quarter, as
the crisis in Asia contributed to a weakening of global commodity
prices and thus a likely lessening of Canadian export earnings. The
Canadian dollar depreciated further early in 1998, reaching historic
lows against the U.S. dollar in January, but it has rebounded with
the tightening by the Bank of Canada in late January.    

Long-term interest rates have generally declined in the other G-10
countries since the end of 1996. Japanese long-term rates have
dropped about 90 basis points, with most of the decrease coming in
the second half of last year as evidence of sluggish economic
activity became more apparent. German long-term rates have also
fallen about 80 basis points as expectations of tightening by the
Bundesbank diminished, especially toward the end of the year. The
turbulence in Asian asset markets likely contributed to inflows into
bond markets in several of the industrial countries, including the
United States. Long-term rates in the United Kingdom have
declined about 150 basis points. Legislation to increase the
independence of the Bank of England and repeated tightening of
monetary policy during the year reassured markets that some
slowing of the very rapid pace of economic growth was likely and
that the Bank would be aggressive in resisting inflation in the
future. Three-month market interest rates generally have risen in the
other G-10 countries, although there have been exceptions. Rates
have moved up the most in Canada (more than 180 basis points)
and the United Kingdom (120 basis points), in response to several
increases in official lending rates. German rates have risen about 40
basis points. Short-term rates in the countries that are expected to
adopt a single currency on January 1 of next year converged toward
the relatively low levels of German and French rates, with Italian
rates declining more than 100 basis points over the year.    

Equity prices in the foreign G-10 countries other than Japan moved
up significantly in 1997. Despite some volatility in these markets,
particularly in the fourth quarter following severe equity price
declines in many Asian markets, increases in equity price indexes
over 1997 ranged from 17 percent in the United Kingdom to almost
60 percent in Italy. In contrast, equity prices fell 20 percent in
Japan. To date this year, equity prices in the industrial countries
generally have risen.    

The price of gold declined more than 20 percent in 1997 and fell
further in early 1998, reaching lows not seen since the late 1970s.
Open discussion and, in some cases, confirmation of central bank
sales of gold contributed to the price decline. Downward
adjustment of expectations of inflation in the industrial countries in
general may have added to the selling pressure on gold. More
recently, the price of gold has moved up slightly, on net.    

 FOOTNOTES 

1. Over the past three years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has
introduced a number of technical changes in its procedures for
compiling the CPI, with the aim of obtaining a more accurate
measure of price change. Typically, the changes have only a small
effect on the results for any particular year, but their cumulative
effects are somewhat larger and are tending to hold down the
reported increases of recent years relative to what would have been
reported with no changes in procedures. Apart from the procedural
changes, the reported rate of rise from 1998 forward will also be
affected by an updating of the CPI market basket, an action that the
BLS undertakes approximately every ten years.    

2. This index weights currencies in terms of the importance of each
country in determining the global competitiveness of U.S. exports
and adjusts nominal exchange rates for changes in relative
consumer prices. 
  