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Monthly
Economic Outlook
May 9, 2001
Economics
Group

U.S. Overview
For the past six months, both Wall St. and Main St.
have been on recession watch, trying to gauge
the severity of the gathering economic storm.
Aprils stunning loss of 223,000 jobs and jump in
unemployment to 4.5% signaled to us that this
storm is reaching hurricane force. Recession is still
not inevitable, but, based on historical precedent, it
now appears considerably more probable.
If a recession is unfolding, in our view it will not
have been caused primarily by the Fed, nor by the
stock market, nor by the consumer. It will rather be
the inevitable outcome of the inexorable dynamic
of all business cycles  CEOs reacting to declining
profits with cutbacks in employment and capital
spending. In this cycle the profit squeeze derived
from excess capacity after the late 1990s wave of
new investment, primarily high tech, as well as the
jump in energy and labor costs.
Given the increased threat of recession, we have
reduced the expected cycle low for fed funds from
4.0% to 3.5%, now looking for 50bp cuts on both
May 15 and June 27. It should be noted, however,
that bond market futures are placing a low prob-ability
of fed funds going below 4%. Also, the
behavior of longer term yields and the stock
market still indicate that they are focused more on
a 4Q or 1Q economic recovery than they are on
the potential for negative GDP in the 2Q and 3Q.

International Overview
Due in part to the slowdown in the United States,
economic activity in most foreign countries has
decelerated. Although this moderation in foreign
growth rates is not unexpected, we have marked
down our outlooks somewhat for these
economies due to the downward revision to our
U.S. growth forecast.
Slower growth abroad should lead those
respective central banks to ease policy further.
However, the European Central Bank likely will
continue to drag its feet due to its preoccupation
with inflation. That said, slower Euroland growth
eventually should cause even the stubborn ECB
to ease policy.
Although U.S. economic activity has decelerated,
the greenback has remained remarkably strong.
The dollars resilience versus many currencies
may reflect the markets expectation that U.S.
growth will strengthen significantly going forward
due largely to the aggressive pace of easing that
the Fed has undertaken since the beginning of
the year. Indeed, the U.S. yield curve has
steepened significantly since that time,
suggesting that investors look for growth to pick
up going forward. In contrast, respective yield
curves in Euroland and Japan have steepened
very little relative to their U.S. counterpart over
that period.

U.S. Outlook

For the past year, many analysts feared that
consumer spending would collapse due to the
negative wealth effect of declining stock prices.
Instead what happened was that real consumer
spending growth only reverted from its supernova
pace of 6% (driven by a positive wealth effect) back
to its normal 3% pace. The lesson was that while
the negative wealth effect could curb the growth of
consumer spending, it could not kill it.
Negative Income Effect
Now, however, consumer spending will be hit by a
negative income effect, and based on historical
precedent, that spells serious trouble. Aprils job
loss in the private sector was 261,000 (government
added 38,000), after a 64,000 decline in March.
Since 1950, there have been only 12 instances of
two initial consecutive monthly declines in private
sector jobs, and in 8 of those cases, recession
ensued. Based on that historical precedent, the
probability of recession would be 67%.
Further, the rise in the unemployment rate to 4.5%
from 4.3% in March is also ominous. While the level
is still low, it has been the degree of increase in
unemployment, not its level, that has been the key
indicator in past cycles. Especially relevant
currently is the experience of the 1950s and 60s,
the last time the U.S. had unemployment of 4% 
before the baby boomers invaded the labor market.
The evidence of those cycles was that an
unemployment increase of more than one half
percentage point marked the onset of recession,
and that pattern then continued through the
recessions of subsequent decades as well.
This cycles low in unemployment was 3.9%, so
Aprils 4.5% level has reached the threshold that
signaled recession in all cases since 1950.
American consumers are very resilient and do not
reduce their spending unless forced to. They are
the most reliable cog in the U.S. economic machine
 give them a job and a raise and they will spend it.
The experts keep wanting them to save more, but
fortunately for economic growth, they dont.
However, when they no longer have a job, and the
income is gone, then discretionary spending does
get put on hold.
Forecast Update
In our updated forecast on page three we now
expect declines in big ticket items, and a marked
slowing in consumer spending on staples and
services. The result is essentially no growth in real
consumer spending during the 2Q and 3Q  after
an average 3% pace in the 1Q and 4Q. We already
had expected the declines in capital spending to
continue. For overall real GDP, the estimate is now
for zero in the 2Q and a 1.5% decline in the 3Q
(prior was 2Q at 1.3% and 3Q at 1.5%). A return to
a positive 1.0% in the 4Q is expected as some help
from tax cuts begins to filter into consumers
pocketbooks.
Such a forecast would not meet the short hand
definition of recession as two consecutive quarters
of declining real GDP, although with a rise in the
expected unemployment rate to 5.0% the 4Q, it
certainly would meet the average persons criteria.
There are two reasons why the forecast isnt more
dire  construction and inventories.
Housing and Inventories
There has never been a recession in the U.S.
without a plunge in the housing market. While our
forecast does have a 5% decline in the second half
of this year, in prior recessions there were always
drops of 20% or more. Indeed, when we say that
we dont think the Fed is the primary cause of the
current economic difficulties, it is because the most
direct impact of Fed policy has historically been on
the interest sensitive sectors  construction being
the primary example. If the Fed were the primary
cause of an impending recession, the housing
market would be in the tank. But on the contrary, it
is still thriving, and providing an important offset to
the damage being done by the high tech capital
spending downturn.
Also, the degree of inventory slowdown in the past
three quarters, at $85B, is already almost as large
as the negative impact on GDP from inventory
reductions in past recessions. In the 1Q alone, it
subtracted 2.5 points from GDP. The fact that
inventory levels have been adjusted so quickly
means there should be less further liquidation even
as consumer spending stalls. The planned uptick in
motor vehicle production in the 2Q (vs. 1Q) should
keep inventories from declining, but then some
further liquidation is expected in the 3Q. If
consumer spending falls more than we expect, there
would, of course, be another severe round of
inventory cutbacks. But for now, the quick early
retrenchment is encouraging.
The Fed, Inflation, and Long Term Interest Rates
The April figures on layoffs and initial claims argue
for further job losses in May and June, which in turn
argue for a 3.50% fed funds rate by the end of June.
Some analysts (and the longer end of the yield
curve) see the Fed as being too aggressive, inviting
higher inflation and a return to the 1970s boom/bust
cycles. While certainly a concern, the Fed will likely
take that risk. The leading indicators of inflation are
tilting sharply lower. Also, in hindsight the Fed
knows it was not aggressive enough in 1989-90
during the commercial real estate collapse, and that
the Japanese central bank acted too little, too late
when their countrys speculative bubble burst. Deal
with jobs and profits now. Worry about inflation later.

Economic Forecast

International Outlook

International Outlook
As the discussion on page 2 indicates, U.S.
economic activity remains sluggish. Slowdowns are
underway in many foreign countries also. As shown
on the front page, the Euroland purchasing
managers index (PMI) for the manufacturing sector
has declined to its lowest level since the depths of
the Asian economic crisis in late 1998. Indeed, the
PMI currently stands below 50, suggesting that
manufacturing activity in Euroland is now
contracting. Survey data from Japan indicate that
the manufacturing sector in that country has
weakened significantly in recent months. The
manufacturing PMI in the United Kingdom has
slipped below 50, and data out of Canada indicate
that manufacturing activity in that country has
weakened.
These slowdowns abroad are not unexpected. Due
to previous monetary tightening in most foreign
countries and to higher energy prices, we had
expected that growth rates in most foreign
economies would moderate this year. However, the
downward revision to our U.S. growth forecast has
compelled us to mark down our outlook for growth in
most foreign countries. Indeed, respective growth
rates in the value of U.S. imports from Japan and
Canada have weakened noticeably over the past
few months (see graph below). Although U.S.
imports from the European Union have held up
better, they too have decelerated somewhat since
last year. Looking forward, foreign exports to the
United States should continue to weaken as growth
in U.S. domestic demand moderates further.
The economic slowdowns that are in train should
induce central banks in those countries to ease
policy further. We look for another 50 basis points of
ease from the Bank of England by summer, taking
the repo rate down to 5.00% from the cycle high of
6.00% early this year. Due in part to the downside
risks that the U.S. economy poses for the Canadian
economy, the Bank of Canada should continue to
reduce its policy rates in line with further Fed easing.
The Bank of Japan will continue to target the amount
of bank reserves, keeping short-term interest rates
essentially at zero percent for the foreseeable future.
However, the ECBs preoccupation with inflation will
keep it on the sideline in the near term. That said,
slower growth in Euroland, which eventually will
diminish the inflation threat, should allow the ECB to
move to a more accommodative stance in the
second half of this year.
The above discussion sheds some light on the
dollars continued strength versus most foreign
currencies. Although U.S. growth is slowing, which
should weigh on the dollar as real rates of return in
the United States decline, economic activity in most
foreign economies also is decelerating. Not only are
foreign exports weakening, but domestic demand in
most foreign countries also is decelerating. For
example, growth in Euroland final domestic demand
(final sales to consumers, businesses, and
government) slowed to 2.4% (year-on-year) in the
fourth quarter from 3.3% in 2000-Q2.
Moreover, financial markets are forward looking, and
aggressive easing by the Federal Reserve so far this
year has stoked expectations that U.S. growth will
strengthened significantly going forward. Although
we do not completely share this view, we can not
ignore the message that the market is sending
currently. As shown below, the U.S. yield curve has
steepened significantly since the Fed began
aggressively cutting rates earlier this year. (A
steepening yield curve usually indicates that
investors expect growth to strengthen going
forward.) Respective yield curves in Euroland and
Japan have steepened very little relative to their
U.S. counterpart over that period. Therefore,
investors expect that growth in the United States will
strengthen more going forward than in Euroland or
Japan. This expectation may explain the dollars
recent strength against those currencies.

International Economic Forecast
