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Monthly
Economic Outlook
September 7, 2000
Economics
Group

U.S. Overview
In our January 11 monthly outlook report, we said
the economic picture looked too hot not to cool
down and that a scenario similar to late 1994 and
early 1995 could well develop. That perspective
was prescient, but too early. Growth continued to
power ahead until spring, as we analysts ran out of
superlatives to describe the stratospheric surge in
housing activity and consumer spending.
Finally, however, the combination of Fed rate hikes
and surging energy prices took their toll, and since
May, economic momentum has shifted gears. The
Fed has reacted by remaining on hold at their last
two meetings  and appearing very unlikely to
tighten again this year. Indeed, the futures markets
have begun to price in the possibility of a Fed ease
by the spring of 2001.
Such a move is unlikely, in our view, since we see
the shift in economic momentum as a return to
normal from the supercharged surge of recent
years. The adjustment process is likely to be a
temporary one, not the start of a prolonged period
of weakness. In 1995, the Fed did ease during a
similar correction, but then the Mexican peso crisis
and the Orange County default had raised the
financial risks. Absent such an event, the Fed
should stay on hold as the adjustment process
runs its course. By next spring, the pendulum is
more likely to swing back to further Fed tightening.

International Overview
On a weighted-average basis, the greenback
stands near its strongest level in over a decade.
The dollars strength reflects the stellar economic
performance of the U.S. economy that is due in
part to rapid growth in capital spending. The
resulting acceleration in productivity has lifted
growth and constrained inflation. Consequently,
high real rates of return have attracted capital
flows to the United States, boosting the value of
the dollar. Indeed, net capital inflows to the
United States have averaged over $230 billion
per year over the past 3 years while Euroland
has hemorrhaged capital. At the same time,
however, the United States has incurred a
whopping current account deficit.
Looking forward, we project that the sheen
surrounding the U.S. economy will dim
marginally as growth moderates somewhat but
inflation edges up. Consequently, the real return
on U.S. assets will decline somewhat, eroding
the strength of capital inflows. Moderation in
capital inflows in conjunction with very large U.S.
current account deficits should put downward
pressure on the dollar. That said, even if this
depreciation is realized, the weighted-average
value of the dollar would end the forecast period
at a much higher level than it was during the
early- and mid-90s.

U.S. Outlook

The shift in the momentum of growth is very clear in
the chart on the front page. Retail sales growth over
the past three months (thin line) has decelerated
sharply to 2% from 14% in February, which has
brought the yr/yr increase (bold line) down to 8%
from its peak of 10.5%. Key to the outlook is what
that chart will look like six months from now.
The Consumer/Employment Picture
Job and income growth argue for retail sales to
return to the 5%-6% range. The rationale is job
growth of 1.5%-2% and raises of 3.5%-4.0%
generating new income of 5%-6%. That was the
trend prior to the mid-1998 surge. The exploding
stock and housing markets, plus the refinancing
binge (after the Feds shot of adrenaline in the fall of
1998) created extra income that in turn drove
consumer spending to new heights.
With those superchargers now gone, the pace of
retail sales is returning to normal and should match
the trend of regular income growth. But that
adjustment process involves a temporary period of
below trend sales gains, which is now occurring. In
real GDP terms, our forecast has consumer
spending growth remaining near 3.0% in the second
half (in contrast to 5.5% in 1999), but then picking up
to the 4.0%-4.5% in the first half of 2001.
The July and August employment reports had large
declines due to the end of the Census and the strike
at Verizon. Adjusted for those factors, new jobs
averaged 184,000, or a 1.7% annual rate. What is
the risk that job growth will falter, ushering in serious
trouble and a Fed ease  as in 1989 and 1995? Not
high according to the Manpower survey. Shown as
the bold line on the chart below, hiring intentions for
the 4Q (for all workers, not just temps) is at an all
time high. It reflects the demand for workers, which
continues to outstrip supply. That gap is a recipe for
continued upward pressure on wages.
The Inflation Picture
The spring scare regarding core inflation has faded
and most analysts think it will not return. Were less
sanguine, expecting the core CPI to move above
3% by next spring. Currently, its 2.4%, up from 1.9%
in early 1999. Our rationale is based on further cost
pressures with less offset from productivity gains.
The rise in energy prices has virtually wiped out any
real increase in wages this year. Past precedent
shows workers become more aggressive about
raises in the year following spikes in gasoline prices.
Also, the longer energy prices continue to rise, the
more they squeeze margins and pressure
companies to raise product prices. Already the trend
of core services prices has moved up to 3.3%, in
sharp contrast to the only 0.4% rise in core goods.
Service sector prices better reflect the severity of the
domestic cost pressures since they have less global
price competition and lesser productivity benefit.
The Real GDP/Productivity Picture
After moderating to 3.0%-3.5% in the second half of
this year, we expect real GDP growth to move up to
4.0%-4.5% in the first half of 2001. Even with a new
higher sustainable real GDP growth trend of 4%, it
seems unlikely that enough slack could develop
such that cost pressures would be alleviated. In
recent years, it has been the rapid improvement in
productivity that has offset those cost pressures.
The 2Q saw a yr/yr productivity gain of 4.1%, which
offset a 4.7% rise in compensation, putting unit labor
cost growth at only 0.6%.
What about next year? The chart below shows the
close cyclical correlation between real GDP and
productivity. No doubt some of the recent gain in
productivity is structural (and will persist), but with
real GDP growth no longer in the 5%+ range of late
1999 and early 2000, productivity gains will lessen 
and put the Fed back on heightened inflation watch.

Economic Forecast

International Outlook

As shown on the front page, the weighted-average
dollar has moved to its strongest level in over a
decade. The dollars strength against most
currencies reflects the continued solid economic
fundamentals of the U.S. economy. As the graph
makes clear, the dollar has appreciated over the
past few years as the rate of capital spending in the
United States has strengthened. Obviously, the
graph oversimplifies the very complex relationship
between economic fundamentals and foreign
exchange rates. In our view, however, the
correlation between the growth rate of capital
spending and the dollars value is not accidental.
The acceleration in capital spending has helped to
raise the potential growth rate of the U.S. economy.
Consequently, growth has strengthened while
inflation has remained benign. These solid
fundamentals have encouraged foreign capital to
flow to the United States in search of high real ( i.e.,
inflation-adjusted) returns.
Indeed, the dollars strength over the past few years
can be explained with the help of the chart below.
The graph shows that net inflows of direct and
portfolio investment averaged over $230 billion per
year during 1997-99. (In the first quarter of 2000 net
capital inflows totaled $104 billion, a pace that, if
sustained for the rest of the year, would top last
years record of $307 billion by 25%.)
In contrast, capital (both direct and portfolio) has
flowed out of Euroland over the past three years.
Net FDI outflows were especially acute  nearly
$320 billion over the 3-year period. This net outflow
of direct investment capital likely is due in part to the
structural rigidities ( e.g., labor market inflexibility,
high tax rates) that have retarded growth in the euro
zone. The hemorrhaging of capital has continued so
far this year. In the first six months of 2000,
$32 billion (net) has flowed out of the EU-11
countries. (The net outflow would have been even
worse had not Vodafones purchase of German-
based Mannesmann earlier this year inflated the
inbound FDI figures.)
However, on the other side of the balance-of-payments
ledger ( i.e., the current account), the
United States incurs a large deficit. As shown
below, the U.S. current account deficit has widened
steadily to reach a record $331 billion last year. In
contrast, Euroland and Japan each has registered
current account surpluses during the past few years.
The evolution of these current account and capital
account flows hold the key for the dollars value
going forward. As the U.S. forecast on page three
indicates we expect that capital spending will
decelerate somewhat going forward. This projected
moderation in capital spending growth is due to the
delayed effects of higher interest rates and to some
deceleration of high-tech spending. Moreover, we
expect the economys sheen to dim somewhat
relative to the past few years. Namely, as described
on page two, we project that core inflation will edge
higher and that productivity growth will moderate
somewhat. Therefore, because of slightly slower
growth and slightly higher inflation, real returns on
U.S. assets will decline somewhat, eroding the
strength of capital inflows. In the meantime,
however, the U.S. current account position should
remain near the annualized deficit of $409 billion
that was posted in 2000-Q1. The sizeable current
account deficit in conjunction with moderation in
capital inflows will put downward pressure on the
greenback.
That said, even if our foreign exchange forecast is
realized, the trade-weighted dollar would depreciate
by only 10% by the end of the forecast period
(2002-Q2). Moreover, the dollar would be at a much
higher level than it was during the early- and mid-90s,
a period during which U.S. economic
fundamentals were not nearly as strong as our
projections of those fundamentals going forward.

International Economic Forecast
