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Monthly
Economic Outlook
October 10, 2000
Economics
Group

U.S. Overview
The political rhetoric is flying hot and heavy as Mr.
Gore and Mr. Bush try to convince voters that their
plan provides the most economic bang for the
buck. Most voters, meanwhile, are just glad that
there are only four weeks left to have to listen to
these highly exaggerated claims. While there are,
of course, important differences between the two
programs, it should be remembered that both are
centrist. The choice is moderately more liberal or
conservative, not the ideological gap that existed
with Reagan/Carter or Nixon/McGovern. The
economy is great, but higher gasoline prices have
raised the Misery Index, hurting Mr. Gore.
The economic evidence recently supports our view
of a temporary inventory adjustment as consumer
spending has stabilized, but manufacturing orders
and employment are weak. This pattern could well
continue in the 4Q, keeping the second half real
GDP gains in the 3% range. But we expect 4%+
growth again in early 2001 as the inventory drag
fades and manufacturing rebounds.
The consensus on interest rates has become a bit
less optimistic due to renewed decline in
unemployment, the Feds latest statement, and the
prospect of less Federal debt reduction. However,
we think the markets are still not prepared for an
uptick in core inflation, which by next spring could
put a Fed tightening back on the radar screen.

International Overview
Japanese export growth appears to be
plateauing as growth rates in other Asian
countries, important trading partners of Japan,
have moderated. Therefore, the economic
recovery in Japan will become more dependent
on domestic demand going forward. Although
consumer spending currently is sluggish, it
should strengthen as bonus payments rebound
due in part to rising corporate profits.
Economic growth in Euroland appears to have
peaked. However, we do not look for a
precipitous drop in continental growth rates as
the weakness of the euro should temper any
deceleration in exports. In addition, consumer
spending should remain reasonably supported
because consumer confidence remains near
historic highs, although it has weakened
somewhat because of the runup in energy
prices.
The apparent moderation in U.K. growth has
some investors believing that the next move in
U.K. policy rates may be down. Although this
expectation may in fact be realized, this likely will
not happen until the Bank of England is
convinced that wages will not accelerate. Given
the tightness of the labor market, it may be some
time before the Banks comfort level is realized.

U.S. Outlook

Economics are not the only factor in presidential
politics, Mr. Carvilles 1992 mantra its the economy,
stupid notwithstanding. Past elections, however, do
indicate a powerful economic influence. The Misery
Index (front page) combines the Unemployment and
Inflation Rates. A rise from 9.5% in 1988 to 10.5% in
1992 hurt George Bush, Sr. It has fallen during the
Clinton years, but note that it has moved up from
5.8% in mid-1998 to 7.4% currently due to the surge
in gasoline prices. So while the economic climate in
general favors Mr. Gore, he could be vulnerable.
Note the similarity with Hubert Humphrey in 1968.
Federal Surplus Projections & The Fed
The era of Federal Budget surpluses is still so new
that many voters are skeptical of its sustainability.
For sure, a $4.6 trillion surplus over the next ten
years will not materialize  but not due to an overly
rosy economic scenario. Both the CBO
(Congressional Budget Office, under Republicans)
and the OMB (Office of Management and Budget,
under Democrats) have used similar assumptions in
making their projections.
The graph on the left has the CBO assumptions
through 2010. Note that real GDP growth after 2001
is in the 2.5%-3.0% range, as opposed to the 4.0%-4.5%
annual rates actually achieved during 1997-
2000. Note also that the unemployment rate moves
up to 5% in the second half of the decade vs. the 4%
level in recent years. Both of those factors act to
lower the projected surplus, allowing for a recession
or two  although not forecasting a specific time or
depth to a possible recession.
The reason the surpluses will not materialize has to
do with politics, not economics. Indeed, the whole
point of the candidates' budgets is to frame their
differences on how to use the non-Social Security
portion ($2.6 trillion). Whether Mr. Gore spends it
or Mr. Bush cuts taxes is, in economic terms, less
crucial than the shift to a more stimulative fiscal
policy. The Federal Reserve will conduct monetary
policy in a more restrictive manner than were the
entire surplus used for debt reduction. In 2001 and
2002, the estimated non-Social Security surplus is
some $100B-$125B. To the extent it is used as
either Mr. Gore or Mr. Bush propose, the Fed would
either raise rates more, or lower them less than
would otherwise be the case.
Inflation and GDP Growth
In our view, gasoline prices have peaked, which
should allow the overall CPI to move back below 3%
next year from its current 3.6% yr/yr pace. However,
our forecast (page three) expects core CPI to
accelerate to 3.2% by next spring, well above its
current 2.6% level. It is that pick-up which lies
behind our minority view that interest rates could
move higher in 2001. The chart on the right indicates
that the trend of core inflation is now up, supporting
the Feds latest statement that the balance of risks is
still weighted toward higher inflation.
Real GDP growth of 3.0% in the 3Q is temporary, in
our view, driven by a retail inventory correction and
by residential construction returning to normal . As
those sectors stabilize, we expect real GDP to move
above 4% again in early 2001, pushing unemploy-ment
lower. Meanwhile, workers will likely become
more aggressive regarding wage increases in 2001
as they attempt to recover the purchasing power
wiped out by higher energy costs in 2000.
In recent years, upward cost pressures have been
offset by productivity gains and a stronger U.S.
dollar. The productivity surge occurred as yr/yr real
GDP growth jumped to 6.1% in 2Q 2000 from 3.9%
in 3Q 1998. With yr/yr real GDP moving back toward
4%, productivity will provide less offset. G-7 help for
the Euro makes it unlikely the dollar will continue to
surge, which will also provide less offset to inflation.

Economic Forecast

International Outlook

As shown on the front page, growth in Japanese
industrial production is the strongest it has been
since early 1997, before economic crises devastated
the economies of many other Asian countries.
Indeed, the upturn in Japanese IP growth has
coincided with the marked economic recoveries in
most Asian countries that have spurred growth in
Japanese exports. However, as the graph also
indicates, growth in Japanese exports appears to be
moderating, in line with the slowdown in economic
growth in other Asian economies, to which Japan
sends over 35% of its exports. For example, GDP
growth in Korea slowed to a 9.6% pace (year-on-year)
in the second quarter from 12.8% in 2000-Q1.
Slower growth in emerging Asia implies further
deceleration in Japanese exports going forward.
Thus, the onus for keeping the Japanese recovery
alive is shifting from external stimulus to domestic
demand. Is domestic demand strong enough to
shoulder the burden? Unfortunately, consumer
spending remains sluggish. However, stronger
growth in domestic demand may be just around the
corner. The recently released Tankan survey of
Japanese business sentiment showed that capital
spending by all firms is expected to edge up by 1.5%
this year. Although far from strong, capital spending
no longer would be a drag on growth. (Last year,
capital spending tumbled over 9%.) In addition,
business profits should be strong for the second
consecutive year. If so, bonus payments should
rebound in December, which should help strengthen
consumer spending. Therefore, we project that the
Japanese economy will continue to accelerate, albeit
gradually.
As shown below, growth in German IP (more
broadly, Euroland IP) also may have peaked as
growth in exports appears to have plateaued.
Although the pace of economic activity likely will
moderate somewhat over the next few quarters, we
do not expect a precipitous drop in Euroland growth
rates. First, the weakness of the euro will temper
any moderation in export growth. Second, although
consumer confidence has weakened recently due to
the runup in oil prices, it remains at high levels
because of significant declines in unemployment
rates over the past few years. Thus, consumer
spending should remain reasonably supported.
Although the ECB may hike rates a few more times
to insure that inflationary expectations are not
stoked, its tightening cycle should be nearing an
end.
The U.K. economy remains somewhat bifurcated
with manufacturing output growing at an anemic
1.8% rate (year-on-year), and recent PMI data
pointing to continued weakness. The service sector,
where output is up 3.5%, has been more buoyant.
However, growth in that sector may be peaking as
well. Does this mean that the next move in policy
rates is down?
Perhaps, but any such move, if it in fact occurs,
likely will not take place for some time. As shown in
the graph below, the RPIX inflation rate, which
excludes mortgage payments, is below the Banks
target rate of 2-1/2%. However, the rise over the
past year in the RPI inflation rate, which includes
mortgage payments, may have important
implications for the evolution of the RPIX rate.
Because mortgage payments have risen over the
past year as interest rates have climbed (most
mortgages are floating-rate), consumers have less
disposable income to spend on other goods. In
addition, disposable income has been eroded by the
rise in energy prices. Therefore, workers may seek
to recoup some of these losses in the form of higher
wages. Given the tightness of the labor market (the
unemployment rate is at a 25-year low), employers
may have no other option than to grant their
requests. Thus, until unemployment stops falling
and the Bank feels comfortable that wage inflation
will not pick up, the Bank likely will refrain from
cutting rates. It may be some time before the Banks
comfort level is realized.

International Economic Forecast
