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Monthly
Economic Outlook
December 11, 2000
Economics
Group

U.S. Overview
Wall Street continues to suffer from its speculative
hangover, with a rising chorus of analysts warning
that it could trigger a recession on Main Street. For
investors and businesses the meaning of the word
"risk" has changed. From the mid-1990s through
this past spring, risk was perceived as opportunity
cost, or the risk of not making enough money, of
seeing others earn a higher return. Now risk has
become the threat of absolute loss, of seeing
returns and/or profits actually decline. That first
view of risk is called greed; the latter is fear.
In our view, the prospects for the economy are not
as dire as is the view from Wall Street. However, it
is clear, as Mr. Greenspan indicated last week,
that In periods of transition from unsustainable to
more moderate rates of growth, an economy is
obviously at increased risk. Psychology is key at
this juncture, as Greenspan also noted. So long as
consumers and businesses on Main Street dont
swing as far toward fear as Wall Street, serious
trouble is not the most probable scenario.
Fortunately, should such trouble develop, both
monetary and fiscal tools could be applied more
vigorously than in past cycles. With inflation low,
the Fed could ease aggressively, and with a large
surplus, taxes could readily be cut. In prior cycles,
inflation and deficit concerns constrained policy,
allowing a slowdown to deteriorate into recession.

International Overview
The dollar has followed divergent courses
recently, strengthening against the currencies of
many developing countries but weakening
versus most major currencies. The dollars
appreciation vis--vis emerging currencies
appears to be related to a generalized pullback
from risk by many investors. Indeed, many stock
markets (in both developed and developing
countries) have struggled recently, and yield
spreads of emerging market government bonds
relative to U.S. Treasury securities have
widened. In addition, country-specific factors,
such as concerns about financial sector fragility
and/or political uncertainty have contributed to
downward pressure on some currencies.
The dollars recent depreciation against most
major currencies has followed a string of weaker-than-
expected U.S. economic data that has
raised concerns that economic slowdown may be
more pronounced in the United States than in
major foreign countries. Consequently, bond
yields in the U.S. have declined more than in
major foreign countries, undermining the demand
for dollars. However, as long as the underlying
U.S. economic fundamentals remain solid,
inflows of direct investment capital should remain
strong. Thus, any dollar depreciation going
forward should remain modest.

U.S. Outlook

Federal Reserve Policy
The Federal Reserve has two objectives  price
stability and sustainable economic growth. In
percentage terms, analysts see inflation of 2% or
less and real GDP growth of 3.5%-4.0% as the
appropriate criteria to measure those goals. Since
May of 1999, the Fed had believed the sole risk to
future prosperity was from the threat of inflation.
But Mr. Greenspan signaled last week that he now
sees a possibility of excessive softening. For
that reason, the Fed will switch its policy state-ment
on December 19 to reflect a view that the
risks to its two objectives are evenly balanced.
How serious is the economic slowdown? Rather
than just moderation, will it deteriorate into real
trouble? Are Alan Greenspan and the Fed behind
the curve again as was the case in 1990? That
recession had begun in July, although not officially
designated as such until October. The transcript of
the August 21, 1990 Fed meeting has Mr.
Greenspan saying, Those who argue that we are
already in a recession I think are reasonably
certain to be wrong. Dj vu?
The financial markets think so. But they also think
he will soon realize how dire things are, and then
ease policy quickly. Futures markets now expect
the first 25 bp rate cut on January 31, another in
the spring, and a third in the summer, putting the
fed funds rate at 5.75% by September of 2001.
In his speech last week, Mr. Greenspan certainly
made it clear that the Fed is on alert and will act - if
and when needed. However, he showed no sense
of the urgency being reflected in market prices.
Indeed, one of the first points he made was that
current circumstances are in no way comparable
to those of 1998 . . . markets have continued to
function reasonably well and credit continues to
flow. We think he was cautioning Wall Street not
to expect the Fed to rescue those who had
speculated and lost  in either stocks or bonds.
We do now think it likely that the Fed will reduce
rates in 2001, but not on Wall Streets timetable. If
the Fed acts too early they risk the moral hazard
problem of fostering a return to the speculative
investment climate they have spent several years
trying to reign in. Also, while prices of globally
traded goods are not rising, inflation in
domestically oriented services and home prices is
still moving higher. Finally, we think the Fed
would like to gauge the fiscal pulse of the new
President and Congress before acting.
Given those assumptions, we see the 2Q as the
more likely timing of a rate cut. Since the bond
market expects an early 1Q cut, Treasury rates
could well rise, temporarily, in early 2001.
Economic Growth Prospects
In view of the increase in initial unemployment
claims, and the bite that higher heating bills will take
out of pocket books, it now looks like 2001 real
consumer spending growth will be 2.5%-3.0%,
about half the pace from 1Q 1999 to 1Q 2000. That
projection assumes 1.5% growth in jobs, plus 4%
raises, less 2.5%-3.0% inflation. The risk is on the
downside, the vicious cycle, with layoffs leading to
less spending and more inventory, forcing further
production cuts and layoffs, etc.
The key to working through the inventory correction
without a downward spiral is the job market. The
unemployment rate reflects the net impact of
layoffs and new jobs. Initial unemployment claims
have risen sharply, but fortunately, the 1Q demand
for new workers as reported in the Manpower
Survey was at a record high. (See front page chart.)
It is likely that the unemployment rate will tick up
gradually to 4.3% by mid-year. But a sharp rise is
unlikely due both to that continued demand and to
the reluctance of many businesses to lay off people
that they spent so much time and energy finding.
Our forecast also projects a significant slowing in
business investment spending, to 5%, less than half
the pace of recent years. Profit margin pressures
and overcapacity concerns are the culprits, along
with the constraint on capital availability for large
companies in the financial markets. Fortunately,
access to credit for the vast cross section of small
and mid-sized companies remains ample. Despite a
modest tightening of bank lending standards, there
is no talk of the credit crunch that we heard from
those businesses in 1989-90, before that recession.
Mr. Greenspan was late to recognize the severity of
those credit crunch headwinds in 1989-90, and will
be especially alert in this cycle. In his speech, while
supporting the use of more prudent lending
standards compared with 1996-1998, he also
cautioned against bankers overdoing it, saying they
should guard against allowing the pendulum to
swing too far the other way. Should he detect such
a swing, he would be much more aggressive in
easing policy than we now believe he intends.
On the brighter side of the ledger, the residential
housing market looks to have stabilized and should
provide a cushion to the economy in 2001. Mortgage
rates at 7.5%, down from 8.6% in May, have already
eased. Also, we think that government spending
will provide more stimulus, and the trade deficit less
drag, to growth in 2001 than has been the case in
recent years. Finally, although winter heating bills
will be ugly, during the balance of 2001, energy
prices should no longer be rising, affording workers
more of a real gain from their annual raises than
has been the case since early 1999.

Economic Forecast

International Outlook

As shown on the front page the exchange value of
the dollar has diverged recently, strengthening
against many emerging-market currencies but
weakening versus many major currencies. What
explains this divergent movement?
In our view, the major reason for the greenbacks
strength vis--vis many emerging-market currencies
is generalized risk aversion among many market
participants that has caused them to eschew
investments in developing countries. This risk
aversion shows up in the decline in most equity
markets (both developed and emerging). In
addition, developing country yield spreads on
sovereign bonds over U.S. Treasury securities have
pushed out recently (see graph below). Although
these spreads are well short of the blowout that
occurred following the Russian debt default in
August 1998, the spreads are near the highs for the
year. Spreads peaked in May when investors fretted
that the white-hot U.S. economy at that time would
cause the Fed to overtighten, thereby causing a
hard landing. The U.S. economy no longer is white
hot. However, concerns about a hard landing
continue to percolate. In this sort of environment,
investors are reticent to take on risk.
Compounding the problem for many emerging
currencies is the fact that the United States is a
major trading partner for most developing countries,
taking in nearly 25% of all developing country
exports. A U.S. slowdown, especially if it developed
into a hard landing, would weaken the demand for
developing country exports. Moreover, a
generalized slowdown in the developed world would
be a major blow to developing countries as many of
these countries are dependent on exports.
There are also some country-specific reasons for the
dollars appreciation versus the currencies of many
developing countries. Anxiety over the fragility of
the financial sectors in Taiwan and Korea has
weighed on those currencies. The Philippine peso
has been whacked by concerns about the exploding
fiscal deficit and by the impeachment proceedings
against President Estrada. Budding economic
crises in Argentina and Peru have pushed many
other Latin currencies lower.
In regard to major foreign currencies, indications of
slower U.S. growth have not been offset by rising
risk aversion, which, as discussed above, have
negatively affected emerging market currencies.
Thus, the greenback has slipped versus many major
currencies, especially European ones. Although
growth is moderating in most major foreign
countries, investors fret that the slowdown will be
more pronounced in the United States. This view is
supported by the chart below which shows the
10-year swap rate in the United States relative to the
corresponding rate in Germany. Over the past few
months, this spread has narrowed about 60 basis
points, lending credence to the view that growth in
the United States is likely to moderate more than in
Euroland. Moreover, this narrowing in the yield
differential between the United States and most
other major countries makes U.S. debt securities
relatively less attractive relative to their foreign
counterparts. Thus, because investors are not
inclined to buy as many U.S. securities, the
greenback softens as the demand for dollars to buy
those securities falls.
That said, the United States remains an attractive
destination for direct investment capital, racking up
nearly $130 billion of such flows in the first half of
the year. Data from the ECB show that a net
. billion of direct investment capital left Euroland
in the July-August period. Much of that capital
undoubtedly was headed for the U.S. (Q3 balance-of-
payments data for the U.S. will be released on
December 14.) As long as underlying U.S.
economic fundamentals remain solid, direct
investment capital will continue to flow into the
country, mitigating dollar depreciation going forward.

International Economic Forecast
